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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, Congress recognized that the number of displaced older
people in the workforce was growing, due in large part to the
problems older people were encountering in finding new jobs once
displaced from a job of many years.' In these times of corporate
downsizing, older workers are particularly vulnerable to bearing
the brunt of workforce reductions due to the fact that they are
often "paid a little more because they have been with the company
a little longer."2 As a result, since 1967 older workers have been
protected from discrimination based on their age by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).3 From the time that
the ADEA became effective until recently, if an employer used
criteria such as high salary, seniority, tenure, or experience to make
unfavorable employment decisions, courts either found that the
1. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1988) states in part:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among
older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their
employment problems grave ....
2. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1209 (7th Cir. 1987), on remand,
692 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ind 1988).
3. 29 U.S.C. SS 621-634 (1988).
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employer was discriminating per se or required the employer to
justify the use of such factors that inevitably correlate with age.4
Now, however, a confluence of Supreme Court decisions, appellate
court decisions, and legislative action and inaction allows employers
to make decisions based on age-correlated factors with virtual
impunity. Today, courts frequently decide age discrimination cases
involving the admitted use of age-correlated factors, which formerly
were sure winners for the plaintiff, on summary judgment in favor
of the defendant.5 Even if a plaintiff can produce other evidence of
discrimination in addition to the age-correlated factor, including
evidence previously characterized as the "smoking gun," plaintiffs
often suffer summary judgment.6 If this trend continues, older
workers will find themselves in the same position they occupied in
1967, when Congress recognized that "the incidence of
unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant
deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative
to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are
great and growing; and their employment problems grave."7
This Article examines the factors that have contributed to the
current state of the law governing age discrimination in
employment. One such factor is the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in
which Congress expanded almost all rights protected by federal
civil rights statutes! However, Congress failed to include the
ADEA in the substantive changes made by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, leaving the ADEA at the mercy. of the Supreme Court's less
than generous pre-1991 employment discrimination decisions.
These decisions include, most notably, Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
4. See infra note 105 for a discussion of cases in which courts found the
employer's use of age-correlated factors violative of the ADEA.
5. See infra notes 112-14.
6. See infra note 54 for a discussion of recent cases in which the defendant
was granted summary judgment despite proof of derogatory comments about the
plaintiff's age, and evidence of an age-related criterion.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (1988).
8. 29 U.S.C. S 626 (1990 & Supp. 1994); see David A. Cathcart & Mark
Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAW. 849, 850-51 (1992)
(debating whether the 1991 Act expanded or restored the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
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Atonio.' The Wards Cove decision, because it substantially limited
a plaintiff's ability to prove a disparate impact case, became the
single greatest impetus to the 1991 Civil Rights Act.'0 The 1991 Act
superseded Wards Cove for purposes of Title VII actions, but not
specifically for the ADEA."
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins12 further exacerbated the deleterious effect of Wards Cove on
a plaintiff's ability to prove a claim under the ADEA. Before Hazen
Paper, the majority of lower courts had determined that, in most
cases, employers were discriminating intentionally based on age if
they used unjustified age-correlated criteria such as seniority or high
salary to make adverse employment decisions. 3 Hazen Paper
approved the use of an age-correlated criterion as a "factor other
than age," which the employee must prove as a pretext for
discrimination.14 In most lower courts, plaintiffs still can prove that
9. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (superseded in part by statute).
10. See Robert Belton, The UnfinishedAgenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
45 RuTGERS L. REv. 921, 924 (1993); Niall A. Paul, Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
A tonio: The Supreme Court's Disparate Treatment of the Disparate Impact.Doctrine,
8 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 127 (1990). See Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting
(Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1989),
for the view that Wards Cove "should not dramatically alter the outcome" in
disparate impact cases, except in close cases. 1da at 46. Professor Player's
conclusion is that Griggs is not dead but only wounded. Id Compare Professor
Belton's view that Wards Cove dismantled the Griggs disparate impact theory,
resulting in one theory of discrimination requiring intentional discrimination.
Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the
Future of Title VII The Needfor a ThirdReconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
223 (1990).
11. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
12. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
13. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
14. 507 U.S. at 608.
[T]he courts of appeals-repeatedly have faced the question whether an
employer violates the ADEA by acting on the basis of a factor, such as
an employee's pension status or seniority, that is empirically correlated
with age.... We now clarify that there is no disparate treatment under
the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature
other than the employee's age.
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such age-correlated factors are discriminatory, using the disparate
impact model of proof. However, in Hazen Paper some members
of the Court expressed doubt whether the disparate impact theory
applies at all in age discrimination cases."5 Indeed, a majority of the
Court noted that the case did not involve disparate impact, and that
the Court had not decided whether disparate impact applies to the
ADEA.16
Because Congress failed to apply the disparate impact provisions
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act to the ADEA, the Supreme Court may
be poised to go one step further than Hazen Paper and expressly
rule that the ADEA does not countenance a disparate impact cause
of action. The result of such a decision would be startling:
employers could use unjustified age-correlated factors to rid their
workforces of older employees. For example, an employer could
eliminate all high salaried employees or all employees with more
than ten years of service. The only limitation would be the
Id. The Hazen Court based this conclusion upon the premise that Congress'
intention in enacting the ADEA, preventing the use of "inaccurate and
stigmatizing stereotypes," did not require that decisions motivated by factors
correlated with age be unlawful. Id at 610.
15. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, cautions that "nothing in the Court's opinion
should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called 'disparate
impact' theory of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at 618. The
concurring Justices also noted that "there are substantial arguments that it is
improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA."
I1
Although the Court's unanimous opinion specifically states that it does not
determine whether the disparate impact doctrine may be used in cases arising
under the ADEA, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court indicates that the
mission of the ADEA is fulfilled without the aid of the "disparate impact"
theory. After explaining the disparate treatment theory as applied in ADEA
cases, she states, "Disparate treatment, thus defined, captures the essence of what
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA." Ia at 610.
Compare infra text accompanying note 130 with infra text accompanying
note 253 for a discussion of the lower courts' holdings regarding disparate impact
under the ADEA before and after Hazen Paper.
16. 507 U.S. at 610. The Court never reached the disparate impact theory
because the employee "claim[ed] only that he received disparate treatment." Id.
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employee's ability to show pretext, which would be a difficult
task." Moreover, even if disparate impact does apply to the ADEA,
proving a disparate impact will be more difficult because Congress
failed to supersede Wards Cove in regard to ADEA actions.
A further complicating factor is the ADEA's defense of
"reasonable factor other than age" (RFOA).8 Before Hazen Paper,
a plaintiff could make a good argument that an age-correlated factor
was not an RFOA, unless the employer could prove a reasonable
basis for the use of such a factor. Although the Supreme Court did
not explicitly mention the defense of RFOA in Hazen Paper, the
decision leaves little room to interpret the RFOA defense as
meaning anything except "any factor other than age." 9 Indeed,
lower courts are interpreting Hazen Paper very broadly."
Furthermore, the courts may ultimately determine that RFOA is
the defense to disparate impact cases, rather than "business
necessity," as some commentators suggest. If an age-correlated
factor does not have to be justified to serve as an RFOA, disparate
impact cases will be precluded.2'
17. See Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling ofMcDonnell Douglas v. Green:
The High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination
Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385, 403 (1994).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19. See 507 U.S. at 611. ("When the employer's decision is wholly motivated
by factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes
disappears. This is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with age, as
pension status typically is."). See Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact
in theAge Discrimination in Employment Act.: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?,
1995 Wis. L. REv. 507, 538 (1995), for the view that Hazen Paper did not
implicate the RFOA defense.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 112-16.
21. See infra notes 147-73 (discussing business necessity); see infra notes 255-
67 and accompanying text (discussing the defense of RFOA). In addition to the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hazen Paper and Wards Cove and Congress' failure
to include the ADEA in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, two other Supreme Court
cases make age discrimination cases harder for plaintiffs to win: St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 506 U.S. 1042 (1993), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986). In St. Mary's Honor Ctr., the Supreme Court held that proof that
the defendant lied about the reason that adverse action was taken against the
plaintiff is not necessarily sufficient to prove discrimination. See infta note 49.
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In Part II, this Article offers a general explanation of the
ADEA. Part II explains theories of discrimination generally and in
relation to the ADEA. Part IV discusses disparate treatment under
the ADEA and the defense of "reasonable factors other than age,"
before and after Hazen Paper. Part V discusses the applicability of
the disparate impact model of proof to the ADEA before and after
the Civil Rights Act of 1991; whether the RFOA defense precludes
proof of disparate impact; and, if not, whether RFOA or business
necessity is the defense in disparate impact cases under the ADEA.
Finally, Part VI suggests an interpretation of the ADEA that will
comport with congressional intent in enacting the ADEA: to
eliminate age discrimination while protecting employers from
employing people who are no longer able to perform the job
because of the effects of aging or some reason unrelated to their age.
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Congress passed the ADEA to prohibit discrimination based on
age against persons aged forty to sixty-five.' The upper age limit
was raised in 1978" and then removed altogether in 1986.24 Because
In Celotex, by reducing the moving party's initial burden, the Supreme Court
made summary judgment for the defendant more likely to be granted. See JACK
H. FRIEDENThAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 445 n.23 (2d ed. 1993). In the same year,
the Supreme Court also decided two other cases that make a grant of summary
judgment more likely: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). "Too
many lower courts have interpreted the trilogy as a license to weigh evidence,
draw inferences in favor of the defendant when it moves for summary, assess
witness credibility and require plaintiffs to prove their cases at the summary
judgment stage." Ann C. McKinley, Credulous Court and the Tortured Trilogy:
The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 203, 255-56 (1993).
22. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, S
12, 81 Stat. 602, 607.
23. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, % 3(a), 12(a), 92 Stat. 189.
24. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-592, S 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342.
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the wording of the prohibitions against age discrimination in the
ADEA was taken word-for-word from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,2" the ADEA now ostensibly provides the same basic
protections from discrimination based on age for people over
forty 6 that Title VII provides based on race, sex, religion, color,
and national origin.7 The remedial provisions of the ADEA were
25. Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). Congress rejected age
as a basis for discrimination under Title VII but directed the Secretary of Labor
to study the problem of age discrimination. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596-99, 9911-
13, 13,490-92 (1964). For the actual report, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE
CIviL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965), and Research Materials, id. For a discussion
of the report, see Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate
Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229, 235,
286-306 (1990); ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, INTERPRETING THE ADEA: INTENT
OR IMPACT, IN AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE
AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68
(M. Lake ed. 1982). Professors Kaminshine and Blumrosen have excellent
sections in their works dissecting the Secretary's report for evidence of whether
the ADEA was intended to prohibit practices that have a disparate impact; each
coming to the opposite conclusion. Kaminshine, supra, at 235; BLUMROSEN,
supra, at 73.
26. The subject of this Article is that the protections appear to be the same,
but may in practice be different. See infra note 27.
27. The ADEA provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
4(a)(1)-(2), 81 Stat. 602, 603 (1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
[Vol. 42:1
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drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act and provide for
liquidated damages for wilful violations.
In addition to the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
and seniority defenses also available under Title VII,29 Congress
added other defenses to the ADEA that were not found in Title
VII. These provide an exception for any action that the employer
takes based on "reasonable factors other than age" or pursuant to a
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1989 & Supp. 1995).
The italicized provisions indicate the differences between Title VII and the
ADEA. The only real difference between the two statutory provisions cited
above is that the ADEA does not mention applicants, although discriminatory
hiring is forbidden. The word "applicants" was added to Title VII in 1972 after
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and after the ADEA to
"perfect[] the Title VII provisions dealing with ... apprenticeship training."
H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155-56.
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1990). In addition, the statute of limitations was extended from two to three
years for a wilful violation. Id This provision was eliminated by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which requires the plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of notice that
the EEOC has terminated its proceedings. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 29 U.S.C.
§ 626 (1990 & Supp. 1995); see Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Title VT!, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog
That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1106 (1993). Congress left the
substantive provisions of the ADEA, which were changed for Title VII,
unchanged for the ADEA. See infra notes 179-89.
29. 42 U.S.C. S 2000 e-2(e), (h) (1988). The BFOQ defense is not absolute
under Title VII, but only applies to sex, religious, and national origin
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
There are defenses under Title VII that are not contained in the ADEA, such
as action taken pursuant to a "merit system or a system which measures...
quantity or quality of production... [or a] professionally developed. ability
test." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(h) (1988).
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bona fide benefit plan, as well as discipline or discharge for good
cause.
30
30. Section 623(f) provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization -
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b),
(c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age, or where such practices involve an employee in
a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with such subsections
would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by such
employer, to violate the laws of the country in which such workplace
is located-,
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c)
or (e) of this section -
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not
intended to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such
seniority system shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of
any individual specified by section 63 1(a) of this title because of the age
of such individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan -
where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of
payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less
than that made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker, as
permissible under section 1625.10, title 29, Code of Federal Regulations
(as in effect on June 22, 1989); or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with
the relevant purpose or purposes of this chapter.
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no such
employee benefit plan or voluntary early retirement incentive plan shall
excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such employee benefit
plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any
individual specified by section 63 1(a) of this title, because of the age of
such individual. An employer, employment agency, or labor
organization acting under subparagraph (A), or under clause (i) or (ii)
of subparagraph (B), shall have the burden of proving that such actions
are lawful in any civil enforcement proceeding brought under this
chapter; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see Howard Eglit, The Age
Discrimination in EmploymentAct'sForgottenAffirmative Defense: The Reasonable
[Vol. 42:1
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Until the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts usually interpreted
the ADEA consistently with Title VII, an approach that the courts
considered appropriate and desirable.3' Because of the changes in
the law brought about by the 1991 Act, however, the ADEA is
probably now governed by law that was superseded for Title VII
but left intact for the ADEA. 2
1H1. GENERAL TBEORIEs OF DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court has developed two theories of discrimin-
ation under Title VII: disparate treatment33 and disparate impact. 4
Courts commonly apply both theories to the ADEA.3 Disparate
treatment occurs when the employer intentionally discriminates
against an employee based on race, sex, religion, color, or national
origin.36 Courts apply the disparate impact theory to employment
criteria that eliminate more persons of a certain protected class than
others. Proof of intent to discriminate is unnecessary in a
disparate impact case.38 Rather, the proof is based on statistical
Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 177-80 (1986).
31. See Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-13, 416-17 (1985);
Monce v. City of San Diego, 895 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); cf Lorillard, Inc.
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). See MACK A. PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 571 (1990); Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 230-31 (1990).
The courts universally apply the disparate treatment theory to the ADEA, see
infra text accompanying notes 46-65; whether the disparate impact theory applies
to the ADEA is less certain. See discussion infra part V.C.
32. See Eglit, supra note 28, at 1103-04.
33. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. See supra note 31.
36. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Steven L. Willborn,
The Disparate Impact Model ofDiscrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L.
REV. 799 (1985), for a good discussion of the difference between the two
theories.
38. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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analysis of the impact of the employer's employment criteria on a
protected class.39
In the early days of Title VII, courts interpreted its provisions
broadly.' As time passed and courts became more conservative,
interpretations of the Act became more restrictive. 4 After the
Supreme Court rendered a decision significantly limiting the
39. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROssMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DIscRIMiNATION LAW 98-102 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing importance of statistics
in class action suits).
40. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 and the Continued Dominance of the Disparate Treatment Conception of
Equality, 11 ST. LoUIs U. PuB. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1992).
41. See Judith J. Johnson, Rebuilding the Barriers: The Trend in Employment
Discrimination Class Actions, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 54-58 (1987);
Lewis, supra note 40, at 2.
Because of restrictive interpretations, plaintiffs had difficulty proving
violations. See generally David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 899, 971 & n.327 (1993). In addition, the equitable remedies of
backpay and reinstatement were the only remedies allowed for Title VII
violations. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(g) (1988). Plaintiffs had to mitigate backpay, and
because few desired reinstatement, the remedies were fairly negligible. See Caryn
L. Lilling, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Examination of the Storm
Preceding the Compromise ofAmerica's Civil Rights, 9 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 215,
250-52 (1991), for a discussion of remedies in cases of intentional discrimination.
The Act did provide for attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988). Plaintiffs
did not have a sufficient incentive to enforce their rights, and employers did not
have a sufficient disincentive to refrain from discriminatory acts. Oppenheimer,
supra, at 934-35. Further, because the remedies were equitable, the plaintiff was
not entitled to a jury trial. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th
Cir. 1975), superseded by 42 U.S.C. S 1981a(c) (Supp. V 1993).
Another consideration served as an impetus for change, especially in the
remedial provisions of Title VII: while plaintiffs alleging national origin or racial
discrimination could sue under 42 U.S.C. 5 1981 and Title VII, and recover
compensatory and punitive damages, plaintiffs alleging sex and religious
discrimination were limited to Title VII equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988);
see Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 8, at 857. Proponents of the equalization
of remedies in Title VII and § 1981 cases also pointed out that often the plaintiff
suffers no loss of pay or position in a sexual harassment case. Id at 857-58.
Consequently, the plaintiff would be afforded no relief, even if she prevailed.
[Vol. 42:1
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disparate impact model under Title VII,' Congress began working
to overturn that ruling, as well as other restrictive rulings.43
The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio," limiting the disparate impact theory as well as decisions
that affected the disparate treatment theory,45 prompted the passage
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The following is an in-depth
discussion of the two theories of discrimination and how they
apply to the ADEA, beginning with the disparate treatment theory.
IV. DIsPARATE TREATMENT
Case law provides four ways to prove disparate treatment under
Title VII, many of which also apply to the ADEA. The first
involves a showing of circumstantial evidence of disparate
42. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (superseded in
part by statute).
43. The other significant rulings were EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 (1991) (Title VII does not apply to United States citizens working for
American companies outside the United States); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1989) (because § 1981 applies only to the formation
of the contract relationship, not to the breach of its terms; discrimination in
hiring, for example, is actionable under § 1981, but racial harassment relating to
conditions of employment is not); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., 490 U.S. 900, 911
(1989) (statute of limitations for attacking a facially neutral and facially applied
seniority system begins to run when the system is adopted); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 759-61 (1989) (allowing persons who could have intervened before the
final approval of consent decrees providing goals for promotion of blacks and
setting forth an extensive remedial scheme to attack the decrees later); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (employer who takes gender
into account in making an employment decision shall not be liable if she proves
that she would have made the decision even without taking gender into account).
There were other cases, not eventually overruled by the 1991 Act. See Lilling,
supra note 41, at 217-19.
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990. The President vetoed the
legislation, and Congress failed to override the veto by one vote. Id at 216-17.
The result was the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a somewhat weakened version of the
Civil Rights Act of 1990. See Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 8, at 870.
44. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (superseded in part by statute).
45. See supra note 43; Oppenheimer, supra note 41, at 935.
1995]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
treatment for which the Court constructed a model of proof in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.a The plaintiff must show that
(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) "that he applied and
was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected;" and
(4) that the employer continued to seek applicants with the
plaintiff's qualifications.4' The Court noted in McDonnell Douglas
that requiring the plaintiff to eliminate the most common causes
for rejection, lack of qualifications and unavailability of a position,
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination, thereby requiring "the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for rejecting the plaintiff."
46. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. Id. at 802. The Court noted that there are other ways to prove a prima
facie case. Id at 802 n.13. For a good discussion of burdens of proof, see Robert
Belton, Burdens ofPleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory
of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1235-40 (1981).
Many courts required more proof for a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Id. For example, the plaintiff had to have been replaced by a
person outside the protected age group. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Western Credit
Union, 62 F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1995); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded, No. 95-364,
1996 WL 14564 (U.S. April 1, 1996); Shore v. A.W. Hargrove Ins. Agency, 873
F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Va. 1995); Blistein v. St. John's College, 860 F. Supp. 256 (D.
Md. 1994), affd, 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1995); Adams v. Dupont Merck
Pharmaceutical Co., 1994 WL 702606 (E.D. Pa. 1994). But see Collier v. Budd
Co., 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1435 (7th Cir. 1995) (court found prima
facie case based on plaintiff's evidence that employer intended to replace him
with younger worker but was unable to do so). The Supreme Court recently
decided, however, that the plaintiff does not necessarily have to prove that he
was replaced by a person outside the protected age group in order to prove a
prima facie case. The court determined that the proper solution to the problem
lies not in making an utterly irrelevant factor [replacement by a person outside
the protected age group] an element of the prima facie case, but rather in
recognizing that the prima facie case requires 'evidence adequate to create an
inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory
criterion.'" O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., No. 95-364, 1996
WL 14564, at *3 (U.S. April 1, 1996).




Once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the
court that the reason given by the employer was not the true reason
for the employer's action, but rather was a pretext for dis-
crimination.49 The Court later clarified, in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,50 that the employer must produce
evidence of a reason for rejecting the plaintiff, but need not
persuade the court that it was motivated by that particular reason.
The Court stated that the plaintiff's initial burden was not onerous
and that the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff at all
times.5 The courts usually apply the allocation of proof of Burdine-
McDonnell Douglas in age discrimination cases.52
A second model of proof of intentional discrimination recog-
49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see Michael J. Zimmer & Charles A.
Sullivan, The Structure of Title VII Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation:
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination, and Burdens of
Proof, 9 HAv. WOMEN'S LJ. 25, 41 (1986). At one time the lower courts held
that this presumption was irrebuttable. The courts assumed that if the employer
lied about the reason, the employer must have intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff as a matter of law. See also Essary, supra note 17, at 403.
The Supreme Court has recently "reinterpreted" its decisions in this regard
in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). In Hicks, the Court
determined that the trier of fact may resolve the ultimate issue of discrimination
vel non based on its disbelief of the employer's reason for its action, but that such
disbelief does not necessarily satisfy the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving
discrimination. The plaintiff must prove not only that the employer's reasons
were untrue, but also that they were a pretext for discrimination. Id at 518-20
(discussing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)).
The Court was apparently recognizing the unfortunate reality that employers
may lie about the reasons for their decisions for a variety of reasons, some of
which are not discriminatory.
An employer may lie because his real reason is ridiculous or arbitrary, but
not actually discriminatory. The proper step at this point should be to put the
burden of persuasion on the employer to prove the real reason, rather than
putting an additional, and in many cases impossible, burden on the employee.
50. 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
51. Id (citing Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S.
24, 25 n.2 (1978).
52. See SCHIEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 497.
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nized under Title VII and the ADEA involves cases in which the
plaintiff can produce direct evidence of intentional discrimination. 3
In such cases, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to
prove that it did not discriminate. 4
53. Trans-World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Lee v.
Russell Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982). Thurston was an age
discrimination case, but the Court noted that Title VII principles were
applicable. 469 U.S. at 121.
"Direct Evidence is that evidence which, if believed, 'establishes
discriminatory intent without inference or presumption.'" Dickson v. Amoco
Performance Prod., 910 F. Supp. 629, 634 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (citing Clark v. Coats
& Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 1993)).
54. See, e.g., Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 841 F.2d
1533, 1539 (11th Cir.), modifiedon other grounds, 848 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1988);
Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). The courts limit direct evidence cases to cases in
which the direct evidence is more than "isolated and ambiguous." Carpenter v.
Western Credit Union, 62 F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1995). The Carpenter case is
one of several recent ADEA cases in which, although it appears that the plaintiff
had found the usually unavailable admission of discriminatory intent by the
employer, the so-called "smoking gun," the court decided that the evidence was
insufficient to treat the case as a direct evidence case. In fact, in Carpenter, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant despite the company
president's statement that the discharge of the plaintiff and another employee
was "purely economical, they were the two oldest employees here." Id at 144;
see cases cited infra note 114.
Similarly, statements by supervisors, including the supervisor who
recommended the plaintiff's discharge, to the effect that they wanted a "'younger
and cheaper' engineer" and were "'going to get rid of the older employees with
the higher salaries,'" were "primarily indicative of a desire to save money by
employing persons at lower pay" and insufficient to shift the burden of
persuasion. Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1218 (5th Cir. 1995).
Statements made by the supervisor shortly before he discharged the plaintiff
that the plaintiff was "'too damn old for this kind of work" and "'it's about time
we got some young blood in this company,'" were insufficient to avoid summary
judgment. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 549 (4th
Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded, No. 95-364, 1996 WL 14564 (U.S. April 1, 1996)
(reversal based on unrelated issue).
In Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1994), the plant manager
responsible for terminating the plaintiffs had on
many occasions [stated] that the "salary workforce[ ] was older, had
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The third type of intentional discrimination case is character-
ized by mixed motives and occurs when the employer is motivated
by legitimate and illegitimate factors.55 Prior to the 1991 Civil
been around too long, made too much money and enjoyed too many
benefits" and that "what this company needed was new younger people,
perhaps people out of college ... that were younger, more aggressive,
hungrier, that would have come and not had six weeks vacation... and
in fact could be hired for, you know, half or 70% of what these people
- enjoy."
Id at 108. The court nevertheless affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the
defendant.
In Caponigro v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 1995 WL 238655 (E.D. Ill.
1995), despite the defendant's "written observation that an older work force
meant higher medical costs," the court found there was no inference of
discrimination, because an employer may base employment decisions on such
costs without violating the ADEA. Id at *8.
In another case, the plaintiff charged age, national origin, and sex
discrimination. The plaintiffs supervisor had said on various occasions that the
plaintiff did not fit into the company image because she was a Filipino, and that
a "male would be more appropriate because Alzona [the plaintiff] had a female
tendency to be 'out of sorts' and women couldn't be trusted in key business roles
because of physiological shortcomings." Alzona v. Mid-States Corporate Fed.
Credit Union, No. 92 C 8244, 1995 WL 134767, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 1995). These
statements, in addition to circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, and the
fact that the plaintiff was replaced with a young American male, were sufficient
to defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all three claims. Id
at *7.
55. See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title
VIIAction: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), is the
best case of mixed motives. In that case, the plaintiff proved that the defendant
had considered her gender in its decision to deny her partnership, because several
partners made comments to the effect that she was too masculine. Id at 235. The
Supreme Court analyzed the case as an instance of mixed motives, id at 232-58,
because the employer said it would have made the same adverse decision based
on legitimate reasons. A four-Justice plurality, while admitting that proof of sex
stereotyping was evidence of gender discrimination, id at 250-51, 258, remanded
the case to allow the employer to prove that it would have made the same
decision based on permissible factors, which, at the time, would have absolved
it from liability. On remand, the defendant was unable to prove it would have
made the same decision without considering the plaintiff's gender. 737 F. Supp.
1202 (D.D.C.), affd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
1995]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
Rights Act, according to the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 6 the employer could avoid liability by proving that it
would have made the same decision for legitimate reasons, even
though the plaintiff's protected status was a contributing factor.57
After the 1991 Act, if the employee shows that his protected status
was a substantial factor in the employer's decision, the employer
has violated Title VII and can only avoid damages and reinstate-
ment by showing that it would have made the same decision
without considering the prohibited factor.5 8 The 1991 Act did not
56. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). A four-Justice plurality of the Court voted to
remand the case for a determination of whether the employer would have made
the same decision for legitimate reasons. Id at 258. Before the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, the courts generally assumed that Price Waterhouse applied to ADEA cases.
See, e.g., Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1216-19 (case arose before the 1991 Act); Starceski v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095-96 (3d Cir. 1995); Glover v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 981 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. granted and
judgment vacated by 114 S. Ct 42 (1993) (remanded for consideration in light of
Hazen); Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1991). See Tyler v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992), for an
excellent discussion of mixed motive cases in the context of age discrimination
in an action under New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEc. LAW % 290-301
(1982 & Supp. 1992), which has been interpreted as being identical to the ADEA.
But see Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1216-19 (case arose before the 1991 Civil Rights Act
holding that a mixed motive instruction was not appropriate because of the lack
of direct evidence).
57. 490 U.S. at 258 (1989). This part of the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse was one of the causes of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See Cathcart &
Snyderman, supra note 8, at 849.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, provides
in pertinent part:
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in employment practices.
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1995).




apply specifically to the ADEA, so it is likely that Price Waterhouse
is still applicable to ADEA cases.5 9
A fourth type of proof under Title VII governs a case in which
intentional discrimination is a "pattern or practice." In a pattern or
practice case, the plaintiff must prove widespread discrimination,
usually using statistics as well as testimony regarding specific
instances of discriminatory treatment. 6 The ADEA does not
specifically authorize pattern and practice suits, but private plain-
tiffs are allowed to bring class-wide disparate treatment suits under
the ADEA. 61
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under
section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the
respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court -
() may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in
clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of
this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in
subparagraph (A).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2)(B) (1995).
See Brodin, supra note 55, at 293, for a good discussion of causation in this
regard. Some commentators fear that this provision will make affirmative action
plans illegal altogether, despite the language in the 1991 Act to the contrary. See
Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 8, at 876-80.
59. See Eglit, supra note 28, at 1153-58.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1995). See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Even if the court finds a pattern and practice
of discrimination, it can deny relief to individual class members against whom
the defendant can prove it did not discriminate. Id. at 361-62; Paul E. Starkman,
Alleging a "Pattern or Practice" Under ADEA: An Analysis of the Impact and
Problems ofProof, 8 LAB. LAW. 91 (1992).
61. Arnold v. Postmaster Gen., 667 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 863 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989); see
Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1216-19; Eglit, supra note 30, at 172-74. Class actions cannot
be maintained under Title VII pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), but must utilize the
opt-in mechanism of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. S 216(b) (1995)
(requiring parties to consent in writing to be party to an action). See SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 495-96.
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The object in all of these types of cases is to determine whether
the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. The
question is whether the employer intentionally treated the
employee differently because of her race, sex, religion, color, or
national origin under Title VII, or because of her age under the
ADEA.
Although courts generally apply to the ADEA the allocation of
proof of disparate treatment developed under Title VII, there have
been some points of difference.62 Most importantly for the purposes
of this Article, cases involving factors that correlate strongly with
age - most notably seniority, salary, and tenure - have, until
recently, usually been brought under the disparate treatment
theory.63 By contrast, cases involving race or sex-correlated criteria
have usually been brought as disparate impact cases under Title
VII.64 The Supreme Court apparently eliminated this difference
between Title VII and the ADEA in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.61
A. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
The plaintiff in Hazen Paper was discharged shortly before his
pension was to vest. He alleged that his employer discharged him
to keep his pension from vesting and because of his age.66 The jury
found that the employer discharged the plaintiff because of his age,
62. See supra note 47.
63. Compare cases cited infra notes 112-14 with cases cited infra note 105.
64. It should be noted that it is not clear under Title VII that it is permissible
to use factors that correlate strongly with race, for example. See generally PLAYER
ET AL., supra note 31, at 334. The issue does not arise in the context of disparate
treatment cases under Title VII, because disparate impact has been used more
commonly in Title VII cases than in ADEA cases. See generally Mack A. Player,
Title VllmpactAnalysis Applied to theAge Discrimination in Employment Act: Is
a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 TOL. U. L. REv. 1261, 1266-67 (1983).
65. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). Since the court analyzed disparate treatment cases
generally, Hazen Paper probably applies as well to Title VII. 507 U.S. at 610. The
consequences of Hazen Paper are more serious for ADEA cases, because disparate
impact has not been definitely determined to apply to the ADEA, as it does to
Title VII.
66. Id at 606-07.
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in violation of the ADEA, and to keep his pension from vesting, in
violation of ERISA.67 The question the Court was concerned with
was whether discharging the plaintiff to keep his pension from
vesting was age discrimination per se. The Court determined it was
not. Although pension vesting or "years of service" was correlated
with age, it was not perfectly correlated with age.6" The pension-
vesting period in this case was ten years, and people under forty
could also be close to vesting.69 The Court ruled that disparate
impact was not a question, because the case had been brought as a
disparate treatment case. In any event, even if the employment
practice had a disparate impact on older employees, the practice was
still a "factor other than age."7' The Court explained,
In a disparate treatment case, liability depends on
whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually
motivated the employer's decision.
Disparate treatment, thus defined, captures the essence
of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the
very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to
be fired because the employer believes that productivity and
competence decline with old age.
The employer may not use age as a proxy for ability, but when the
decision is based on any factor other than age, "the problem of
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears."72
67. Id at 606.
68. Id at 611. The Court did not review but simply noted that the lower
court had properly affirmed the jury's verdict regarding the ERISA violation. Id
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id at 610 (citations omitted).
72. Id at 611. This is consistent with the Court's decision in St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), which was issued shortly after Hazen
Paper. In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that proving only that the employer
lied about the reason for the employment decision was insufficient to show
pretext. In other words, the Court is requiring more proof in disparate treatment
cases, which have always been difficult to prove. See supra note 49 and
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The Supreme Court equated a "factor other than age" with a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and "clarified" that defense as
well.73 A legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 4 or a "factor other
than age" can be any reason, regardless of how improper or illegal,
as long as it does not violate the particular act under which the
plaintiff is suing. "For example, it cannot be true that an employer
who fires an older black worker because the worker is black
thereby violates the ADEA. The employee's race is an improper
reason, but it is improper under Title VII, not the ADEA."75
In Hazen Paper, the Court determined that an employer does
not violate the ADEA if the employment decision is based on any
factor "other than age," even if the factor is correlated with age, as
long as the factor does not correlate perfectly with age or is not a
pretext for discrimination.76 The Supreme Court's decision in
Hazen Paper can be interpreted as being unnecessarily expansive,
diluting the effectiveness of the Act for disparate treatment
purposes.7" Instead of merely holding that an employment decision
accompanying text.
Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act allows jury trials in disparate treatment
cases under Title VII, see infra note 189, assuming it is easier to convince a jury
than a judge, disparate treatment cases may become easier to prove. This may be,
in part, why summary judgment for the defendant is easier to win. Whatever the
reason, the Supreme Court has made it easier for the defendant to have the case
dismissed on summary judgment. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. The Court stated that "[a]lthough some language in our prior decisions
might be read to mean that an employer violates the ADEA whenever its reason
for firing an employee is improper in any respect .... this reading is obviously
incorrect." 507 U.S. at 612 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973) (a Title VII case)).
74. One noted commentator has opined that "reasons which are illegal,
totally irrational, arbitrary or idiosyncratic will not be legitimate because they
cannot or should not support an inference of proper motivation." PLAYER ET
AL., supra note 31, at 523.
75. 507 U.S. at 612.
76. Id at 609-11.
77. Indeed the lower courts are interpreting Hazen Paper to give carte
blanche to treat evidence of the use of an age-correlated criterion as negligible
evidence of age discrimination. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying
discussion. Few courts are requiring the employer to justify the use of an age-
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based on an age-correlated factor was not age discrimination per se,
the Court went farther and determined that the use of a factor that
simply correlated with age was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for discharge requiring the plaintiff to prove pretext. In
other words, the Court would not require the employer to bear the
burden of producing evidence if it had a legitimate reason for using
the age-correlated factor, unless the factor correlated perfectly with
age. 7
8
The Court did not explain which age related factors would not
be allowed but only reasoned that factors such as years of service
are analytically distinct from age because a person under forty could
have ten years of service and be close to vesting as well. 9 The
harder issues are those such as gray hair, which are not exclusively
limited to people over forty but are stereotypical of older people.
If a criterion did not mention age, but was perfectly correlated with
age, such as more than thirty years of service, surely the Supreme
Court would disallow it as a factor "other than age.""
correlated criterion. Compare infra note 116 and accompanying text with infra
notes 113-14 and accompanying text. Robert Gregory disagreed with this reading
of Hazen Paper, interpreting the decision to mean only that the use of an age-
correlated factor is not discriminatory per se. Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in
That Old (I Mean, More "Senior") Dog Yet.! The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391 (1994); accord Sloan, supra note 19.
78. See Gregory, supra note 77; Sloan, supra note 19.
79. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 611.
80. Compare Johnson v. New York, 49 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1995) (policy that
correlated perfectly with age must be justified using BFOQ analysis) with
DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 1995)
(indicating that a "plan cannot be said to be... facially discriminatory [if it]
required referencing a fact outside the... ADEA.").
InJobnson v. New York, the plaintiff, a civilian security guard at a National
Guard base, was required to maintain membership in the National Guard as a
condition of his employment. When the plaintiff was forced to retire from the
Guard at age 70, pursuant to military regulations, he lost his civilian job as well.
The majority required the defendant to prove BFOQ for requiring the dual
status, which necessarily ended with the mandatory retirement. 49 F.2d at 80.
The dissent said that this was a case in which loss of dual status was correlated
with age, but not perfectly correlated because civilian employees could lose their
dual status for reasons other than mandatory retirement. Id at 80-83 (Jacobs, J.,
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The Supreme Court almost exclusively relied upon Title VII
cases to support its conclusion in Hazen Paper.8 The Court never
specifically referred to the defense of "reasonable factors other than
age" (RFOA) nor did the Court analyze the defense except in
general terms, referring to the employment decision as based on
"factors other than age."82 The effect of the Court's decision,
however, apparently precludes a different interpretation of the
defense of RFOA. Although it appears anomalous that the Court
did not attempt a more careful analysis in this regard, the lower
courts prior to Hazen Paper had generally not attempted to analyze
the issue expressly in terms of RFOA either, merely holding that
unjustified age-correlated factors were discriminatory.83 The
explanation may be, as other scholars believe," that the holding of
the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper is simply that the use
of an age-correlated factor is not discriminatory per se. The decision
is susceptible to that interpretation. However, if the remainder of
the opinion is dicta, it is strong dicta, and it has affected the
decisions of the lower courts.85 To fully understand the implications
Hazen Paper may have for the ADEA, an examination of RFOA
before and after Hazen Paper is necessary.
B. Reasonable Factors Other Than Age
The legislative history indicates that Congress recognized that
dissenting).
81. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 608-14.
82. Id at 611.
83. See cases cited infra note 105. The principal cases analyzing RFOA
involved explicit use of age as a factor and should have been analyzed under the
affirmative defense of bona fide occupational qualification, see EEOC v. Chrysler
Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984), or used a factor that correlated perfectly
with age, pension eligibility. See EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 982
F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 869 F.2d 696, 706
(3d Cir. 1989), cert grantedandjudgment vacated, 493 U.S. 801 (1989); EEOC v.
City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
84. See Gregory, supra note 77; Sloan, supra note 19.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 112-16.
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some older persons were not able to perform, and that employers
should be able to make decisions based on an individual employee's
incapacity to perform a particular job."6 In order to make it clear
that an age-related disability that affects job performance would be
a valid basis for disqualification, Congress created the defense of
"reasonable factors other than age."' 7 The ADEA provides, "It shall
not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization - (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under
subsections (a), (b), (c) or (e) of this section . . . where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.""8
Any discussion of RFOA must now center on the Supreme
Court's decision in Hazen Paper,' because the Court strongly
indicated that an employer does not violate the ADEA if he bases
his decision on "any factor other than age."
1. RFOA Before Hazen Paper
Commentators have speculated that the Equal Pay Act of 196390
inspired the RFOA defense under the ADEA 1 This assumption is
likely correct, because the Equal Pay Act (EPA) is part of the Fair
Labor Standards Act from which Congress took the remedial
portion of the ADEA.92 The EPA prohibits employers from paying
a salary differential based on sex for equal work.93 One of the
defenses to the EPA is paying a salary differential based on "any
other factor other than sex." 94 The ADEA added the word
86. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 302.
87. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 302.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988).
89. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for a
description of the case.
90. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
91. Id § 3, at 57; ADEA, 29 U.S.C. S 623(0(1) (1988); see Eglit, supra note 30,
at 194-95.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
93. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 57; see Eglit,
supra note 30, at 194.
94. id
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"reasonable" to "factors other than age." Looking at the statutory
language alone, assuming the EPA inspired the defense of RFOA
under the ADEA, Congress must have meant to impose a higher
burden by adding the term "reasonable" to the same defense under
the ADEA. 5
In fact, most courts have interpreted the EPA's "any other
factor other than sex" to mean more than any factor other than
sex.96 For 'xample, in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.,97 the
employer paid its insurance agents based on past salary. Because
women historically have been paid less than men, the employer's
practice resulted in women being paid less than men. If the court
had applied any factor other than sex, as the Supreme Court did in
Hazen Paper with age, past salary would have clearly qualified as
any factor other than sex. The court in Kouba recognized there are
three possible interpretations:
At one extreme are two that would tolerate all but the most
blatant discrimination. Kouba [the plaintiff] asserts that
Allstate [the defendant] wrongly reads "factor other than
sex" to mean any factor that either does not refer on its face
to an employee's gender or does not result in all women
having lower salaries than all men.[9 ] Since an employer
could easily manipulate factors having a close correlation to
gender as a guise to pay female employees discriminatorily
low salaries, it would contravene the Act to allow their use
simply because they also are facially neutral or do not
produce complete segregation....
At the other extreme is an interpretation that would
95. The legislative history of the RFOA defense is sparse and inconclusive.
See Eglit, supra note 30, at 180-81.
96. See MACK A. PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 418
(2d ed. 1995).
97. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. This is evidently the Supreme Court's interpretation of "factor other
than age" under the ADEA. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610
(1993). Presumably, if the factor correlated perfectly with age, it would not be
a factor other than age. Id
[Vol. 42:1
AGE DISCRIMINATION
deny employers the opportunity to use clearly acceptable
factors. Kouba insists that in order to give the Act its full
remedial force, employers cannot use any factor that
perpetuates historic sex discrimination .... But while
Congress fashioned the Equal Pay Act to help cure long-
standing societal ills, it also intended to exempt factors such
as training and experience that may reflect opportunities
denied to women in the past.99
The court in Kouba, then, concluded that all three of the above
interpretations missed the point, "because they do not focus on the
reason for the employer's use of the factor."1° The court concluded
that the employer cannot use a factor "which causes a wage
differential between male and female employees absent an
acceptable business reason. " '°1
The Supreme Court did not require an acceptable business
reason in Hazen Paper. The Court required any factor other than
age, regardless of the impact it had on the protected age group, as
long as the factor was not perfectly correlated with age or was not
shown to be a pretext for age discrimination. 2 This interpretation
is inconsistent with a reasoned interpretation of the ADEA, which
specifically adds that the factors other than age must be reasonable.
This is especially true when comparing RFOA with its counterpart
under the EPA that does not on its face require a "reasonable"
factor other than sex, but the courts, nevertheless, require
justification for factors that have an adverse impact on gender.
Before Hazen Paper, the prevailing view was that to qualify as
an RFOA, the factor could not be correlated with age." 3 As
Professor Mack Player reasoned, factors that are "inherently time-
based, such as experience, years on the job, and tenure.., are
inherently age-related and thus cannot be considered 'factors other
99. 691 F.2d at 876.
100. Id
101. Id
102. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 611.
103. See cases cited infra note 105; Player, supra note 64, at 1278.
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than age. ' ' 1  The lower courts generally followed this position105
104. Player, supra note 64. Professor Player also thought that RFOA as here
defined should be the defense to disparate impact cases under the ADEA. See
discussion of disparate impact infra Part V.
105. See, e.g., Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991); Abbott v.
Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 875-76 (6th Cir. 1990); Jardien v. Winston
Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1989); White v. Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1988); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d
1202 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled by Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 13 F.3d
1120 (7th Cir. 1994); Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818
F.2d 278, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1987); Dace v. ACF Indus., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir.
1983); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983);
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980). Contra Williams v. General
Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 131 n.131 (5th Cir. 1981); Laugeson v. Anaconda
Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
The courts have not been consistent in analyzing age-correlated factors as
RFOAs; rather, some courts have analyzed such factors as legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons. Other courts have simply said that age-correlated
factors are discriminatory per se; still others have said that age-correlated factors
cannot satisfy business necessity. Only a few courts have analyzed age-correlated
factors in terms of the RFOA defense.
In Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983),
for example, the defendant tried to justify its reduction in work force plan,
which had a disparate impact on older employees, as a cost saving measure
required by business necessity. The defendant had reserved certain positions for
non-tenured faculty, because they were paid less than tenured faculty. Id at 691.
The court said that "economic savings derived from discharging older employees
cannot serve as a legitimate justification under the ADEA . . . ." Id at 692.
Although the plan was based on tenure status rather than age, the court
recognized that
because of the close relationship between tenure status and age, the
plain intent and effect of the defendants' practice was to eliminate older
workers who had built up, through years of satisfactory service, higher
salaries than their younger counterparts. If the existence of such higher
salaries can be used to justify discharging older employees, then the
purpose of the ADEA will be defeated.
Id Although this was a disparate impact case, the court evidently believed that
the policy was discriminatory per se, as did the court in Geller v. Markham, 635
F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), which was also a disparate impact case. In the Geller
case the employer refused to hire teachers with more than five years of
experience, a policy that impacted 92% of the teachers over 40. The court said
that this policy was discriminatory per se and could not be justified by business
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For example, in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.,1"6 the employer discharged
an employee because it wanted to save the high cost of his salary.
The court decided that "[g]iven the correlation between Metz's
higher salary and his years of satisfactory service, allowing Transit
Mix to replace Metz based on the higher cost of employing him
would defeat the intent of the statute."07 The court indicated that
it would analyze the use of pay as a proxy for age on a case-by-case
basis. In response to the dissent's view that discharging one whose
output or productivity was less than another was an RFOA, the
court concluded that this makes "totally vulnerable the employees
who are paid a little more because they have been with the
company a little longer.""0 8 In addition, the court considered that
cost may qualify as an RFOA, citing a Sixth Circuit decision ruling
that the employer may be able to justify the cost rationale if based
on serious economic necessity.'" 9
necessity. Id at 1033-34.
In Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1987), the court was reviewing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The court
ruled that evidence that the defendant would have saved $60,000 in pension costs
in firing the plaintiff 10 months before her pension vested was sufficient to
support the verdict. The court assumed, without analyzing the point, that desire
to save pension costs would violate the ADEA. !kL at 280-81.
In Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1989), the
court approved the instruction to the jury in the lower court that "salary savings
that can be realized by replacing a single employee aged 60, with a younger,
lower-salaried employee does not constitute a permissible, non-discriminatory
justification." Id at 1157. In this case the defendant complained that the plaintiff
was a new hire, thus, his salary did not reflect his seniority. Nevertheless, the
court determined that his salary did reflect his greater experience in the
workforce, which was the equivalent. Id at 1157-58. Similarly, the court in
Laugeson v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975), stated that if "too many
years on the job" meant length of service, which is inevitably related to age, that
would show discrimination. Id at 313.
106. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled by Anderson v. Baxter
HealthCare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993)).
107. Id- at 1207.
108. Id at 1209.
109. Id at 1208 (citing EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th
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The courts that held age-correlated criteria to be discriminatory
per se were incorrect. Congress clearly intended that employers'
business justifications should be considered.11 Equally clear is that
age-correlated factors, without more, should not be considered
"reasonable factors other than age."
2. RFOA After Hazen Paper
Although other scholars opine that Hazen Paper did not
interpret RFOA or did not mean that employers could use "any
factor other than age" as a defense,'11 the lower courts are
interpreting the case very broadly."2 After Hazen Paper, most
Cir. 1984)). In Chrysler Corp., the Sixth Circuit ruled that the company's
imminent bankruptcy may qualify as an RFOA. The case should have been
analyzed as a bona fide occupational qualification case, because there was an
explicit age qualification.
A harder question is whether the desire to save costs should be an RFOA.
There is some evidence that Congress did not intend to allow employers to pay
older employees less because they were less marketable and that this was the very
evil the ADEA was designed to forbid. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 279-83;
cf Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1983) (requiring the employer to prove
that burdening the class of people over fifty-five was the least detrimental
alternative).
[A] general assertion that the average cost of employing older workers
as a group is higher than the average cost of employing younger
workers as a group will not be recognized as a differentiation under the
terms and provisions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory
exceptions applies.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979).
110. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 289; infra text accompanying note
211.
111. See Sloan, supra note 19; Gregory, supra note 77.
112. See Brodie v. General Chem. Corp., 74 F.3d 1248 (unpublished
opinion), available in Nos. 94-8094, -8095, 1996 WL 11838 (10th Cir. 1996). In
Brodie, the plaintiffs lost, and complained that a "pure economic benefit to the
employer resulting from discriminatory discharge of older, more senior,
employees should not provide a carte blanc, instructionally stated, defense to
their age discrimination claim." Id at *5. The court of appeals approved the
instruction citing Hazen Paper. See also EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740 (7th
Cir. 1994) (indicating that discharge to save higher cost of salary, even though
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courts are granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on
the basis that even if the plaintiff proved that the employer acted
based on an age-related criterion, this alone would be insufficient to
create an inference of age discrimination.' In addition, many
highly correlated with age is a lawful motive).
113. See Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1995);
Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 15-2 (5th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 709 (1996) (holding that, even if plaintiff had proven the
defendant relied on his high salary, seniorfty and/or approaching eligibility for
retirement benefits, this would be insufficient to support a finding of age
discrimination); Bradford v. Norfolk S. Corp., 54 F.3d 1412, 1421 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the desire to save the cost of benefits is insufficient to establish an
inference of age discrimination); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d
719 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the mere fact that the employer offered an
enhanced benefit package for waiving statutory rights that may be more valuable
to employees covered by the ADEA is insufficient to constitute disparate
treatment; however, the situation would have been different if the employer had
conditioned enhanced benefits on waiving ADEA rights only), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 306 (1995); Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that
evidence the employer closed two unionized plants where eighty percent of the
employees were over forty and hired workers at two new non-union plants,
eighty-three percent of whom were under forty, was insufficient to survive
summary judgment). But see Alzona v. Mid-States Corporate Fed. Credit Union,
No. 92 C 8244, 1995 WL 134767, at *4 (N.D. I1. 1995) (denying summary
judgment on the plaintiff's age discrimination claim, because the plaintiff offered
evidence to show'not only that she was fired shortly before her pension was to
vest but also that she was replaced with a younger worker, along with other
evidence of pretext.) In EEOC v. California Micro Devices Corp., 869 F. Supp.
767 (D. Ariz. 1994), the court held that an employer's firing of its sixty-two year
old employee due to the employee's impending retirement was not
discriminatory per se. The proffered reason could, however, be a pretext for age
discrimination. Thus, a question of material fact remained and summary
judgment was inappropriate.
Following are several other cases, broken down by particular age-related
criterion, that have ruled that, even if the plaintiff proved that the defendant
acted pursuant to an age-correlated criterion, it is insufficient to create an
inference of age discrimination.
High Salary Costs: Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125-26
(7th Cir. 1994); Phillips v. Lehigh Valley Ass'n of Rehabilitation Ctrs., 1995 WL
27152 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Shore v. A.W. Hargrove Ins. Agency, 873 F. Supp. 992
(E.D. Va. 1995); Kreimeyer v. Hercules Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Utah 1995);
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courts are treating the employer's use of age-correlated criteria as
negligible evidence of age discrimination. Even when coupled with
other evidence that should amount to pretext, courts are granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants.11 4 Some have correctly
Blistein v. St. John's College, 860 F. Supp. 256 (D. Md. 1994), af'd, 74 F.3d 1459
(4th Cir. 1996); Pagliarini v. General Instrument Corp., 855 F. Supp. 459 (D.
Mass. 1994), affid without opinion, 37 F.3d 1484 (1st Cir. 1994); Motzny v.
Hilander Food Stores, 1994 WL 148716 (N.D. IM. 1994), affd, 47 F.3d 1173 (7th
Cir. 1995). But see Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that evidence of high salary along with other evidence of discrimination
was enough to support the lower court's denial of aJNOV for the defendant),
aftd on rehearing en banc, 1996 WL 37846 (5th Cir. 1996); Kraemer v. Franklin
& Marshall College, 909 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying the defendant's
motion to exclude testimony that the defendant used an age-correlated criterion,
the court held that the age-correlated criterion alone would not be proof of
discrimination, but the plaintiff could have an opportunity to prove that it was
a pretext for age discrimination).
Experience or Overqualification: Jenkins v. Holloway Sportswear, 14 F.3d 601
(unpublished opinion), available in 1993 WL 503736 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
even if plaintiff could prove that the defendant discharged him because of his
experience, this alone was insufficient to establish age discrimination); Pagliarini
v. General Instrument Corp., 855 F. Supp. 459, 463 (D. Mass.), afPd, 37 F.3d
1484 (1st Cir. 1994).
114. Pension Benefits: Borza v. Hallmark Cards, 45 F.3d 425 (unpublished
opinion), available in 1995 W 8016 (4th Cir. 1995); Longnecker v. Transco
Energy Co., 1994 WL 382619 (E.D. La. 1994); Babich v. Unisys Corp., 842 F.
Supp. 1343 (D. Kan. 1994).
Healthcare Costs: Caponigro v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 1995 WL 238655
(N.D. Ill. 1995).
Seniority: Lubeck v. Comet Die & Engraving Co., 848 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
Other. Gould v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 880 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(holding that an appreciation of "new ideas" was not necessarily a denigration of
the old and was analytically distinct from age), motion denied, No. 93 C 7189,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14102 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1995), and affld, No. 95-1883,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1402 (7th Cir. Feb. 27, 1996); Leidig v. Honeywell, 850
F. Supp. 796, 806 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding that use of "flexibility" as a criterion
for lay-off, even if it correlates with age, does not constitute evidence of age
discrimination); see, e.g., O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56
F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1995) (supervisor stated that the plaintiff was too old and the
company needed new blood), rev'd and remanded, No. 95-364, 1996 WL 14564
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held that a mere allegation that the defendant used an age-correlated
criterion is insufficient to avoid summary judgment in favor of the
employer."' Few courts have interpreted Hazen Paper to mean that
the use of an age-related criterion, while not discriminatory per se,
must be justified."6
(U.S. April 1, 1996) (reversal based on unrelated issue); Woroski v. Nashua
Corp., 31 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1994) (summary judgment granted despite "some
evidence of age bias" in supervisor's statements); Blistein v. St. John's College,
860 F. Supp. 256 (D. Md. 1994), afftd, 74 F.3d 1459 (4th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff's
discharge was based on high salary; in addition he produced evidence of a
statement by management that the plaintiff would be "deadwood," contradictory
explanations for the discharge and the fact that the plaintiff was the oldest person
in his position, all of which was insufficient to avoid summary judgment); supra
note 54.
At least one court has hinted that it could go even further. In EEOC v.
American Airlines, 48 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 1995), the court noted with regard to
the defendant's express policy of not hiring pilots unless they could progress to
the rank of Captain before the mandatory retirement age of sixty: "There is a
strong argument that American's hire-only-Captains rule is not an age-based
qualification at all, but an experience-mandating qualification." Id at 167 n.4. In
this case the requirement perfectly correlated with age, because the people who
would not be hired would all be over forty.
115. See, e.g., Serben v. Inter-City Mfg. Co., 36 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1402 (1995) (trial judge erred in failing to grant judgment as a
matter of law in favor of defendant, because, inter alia, plaintiffs status as a more
experienced and higher paid employee does not permit an inference of age
discrimination); Greyson v. McKenna & Cuneo, 879 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Colo.
1995) (summary judgment granted when plaintiff's only evidence of
discrimination was that younger employees were retained); Bornstad v. Sun Co.,
1993 WL 257310 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (plaintiff's unsupported belief that age
discrimination was the basis for unfavorable employment decisions was
insufficient to avoid summary judgment).
116. See EEOC v. Insurance Co., 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). In this case,
the insurance company had rejected the plaintiff as a loss control representative,
because he was overqualified. Ia at 1419. The court said that, although being
"overqualified" was not necessarily a violation of the ADEA, because
overqualification could serve as a proxy for age discrimination, the defendant
must provide some objective explanation for the term. Id at 1420-21. The
employer explained that it feared that the plaintiff's experience in loss control
would cause him to delve too deeply into the accounts and waste time. The court
concluded that that explanation was sufficient. Id at 1421.
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The Court in Hazen Paper has damaged the ADEA statutory
scheme. The overwhelming majority of courts have recognized that
in a case in which the employee is alleging age discrimination and
the employer interposes a non-age-related criterion, such as poor
performance, the Burdine-McDonnell Douglas model of proof
applies.117 In other words, the employee bears the burden of
persuasion throughout. The employer need only articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and the employee must prove
pretext. " If the employer uses a particular age as a criterion and
excludes members of the protected group, the employer bears the
burden of persuasion to prove a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). A BFOQ is an affirmative defense and
requires the employer to show that an employment criterion that
is based on the age of the protected group is essential to the
operation of the business."'
Hazen Paper appears to have opened a large gap between the
117. See ScOLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 39 at 497. In Thomure v. Phillips
Furniture Co., 30 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1255 (1995),
the court reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and affirmed the
magistrate's prior grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The
court stated,
Phillips [the defendant] based its decision not on age but on level of
compensation. The warehouse employees with the highest salaries
[among whom were the plaintiffs] were, quite naturally, those with the
most seniority. With service approaching thirty-five years, those
employees were not only in the protected age group (older than forty)
but were also among the oldest employees in the Phillips ware-
house.... Yet an employee's age is analytically distinct from his years
of service.
Id at 1024 (quoting Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)). The court did state
that the defendant had a legitimate business justification because of its economic
difficulties and that younger employees had lost their jobs altogether, while the
plaintiffs had only had their salaries reduced. 1t; see text accompanying supra
notes 46-52 and infra note 280.
118. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39 at 497-502.
119.29 U.S.C. 5 623 (f)(1) (1990); see Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400 (1985).
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proof required for BFOQ"2 ° and the proof required for RFOA.12 1
Where in this scheme should RFOA come in? If the criterion is
based on age or is perfectly correlated with age, BFOQ would
apply.' 2' If the employment criterion is only strongly correlated
with age, the employer has no burden to justify it and can even use
it as a defense under Hazen Paper's interpretation of RFOA or as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."z Logically, RFOA should
apply when the employer's reason correlates with age. At this
point, the employer should have to prove a business reason for
using an age-correlated criterion. If, as the Supreme Court has
indicated in Hazen Paper, the RFOA defense has been stripped of
any meaning independent of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,
the employee bears the burden of persuasion to prove that the
employer used the age-correlated criterion to discriminate based on
age. In other words, the employee must prove that the employer's
reliance on an age-correlated criterion was a pretext for age
discrimination.
Despite the contention of some scholars that the Court did not
interpret RFOA in Hazen Paper,124 there appears to be no place for
the defense otherwise. If the courts do not require the employer to
defend its use of an age-correlated criterion as an RFOA, as in
Hazen Paper, in what situation does the RFOA become a defense?
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately recognizes disparate
impact under the ADEA, the ADEA will retain the aforemen-
tioned gaps."' If the Court determines that disparate impact does
not apply, the ADEA will be more substantially damaged. At the
present time, employers may be deterred from using age-correlated
120. See Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 418-23.
121. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611.
122. Compare Johnson v. New York, 49 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
a policy that correlated with age must be justified using the BFOQ analysis) with
DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 1995)
(indicating that a "plan cannot be said to be... facially discriminatory [if it]
required referencing a fact outside the... ADEA").
123. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610-11.
124. See Sloan, supra note 19; Gregory, supra note 77.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 287-97.
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criteria as the basis for unfavorable decisions, because the criteria
have a disparate impact, which the employer must justify by the
defense of business necessity, on the protected age group.
The Court in Hazen Paper made it clear that it was dealing with
disparate treatment, not disparate impact,'26 but gratuitously
remarked that it had never decided whether disparate impact
applied in an ADEA case."' Although the courts have made it clear
that the allocation of proof in a Title VII disparate treatment case
applies as well to a case of disparate treatment under the ADEA,128
the issue of whether the disparate impact model applies to the
ADEA is not as clear.129 Because the Supreme Court has cast no
doubt upon the subject, most courts have assumed that disparate
impact does apply to the ADEA." ° If the Supreme Court ultimately
decides not to apply the disparate impact model to the ADEA,
Hazen Paper will allow all but the most blatant age discrimination.
Even if the disparate impact model does apply to the ADEA, as
discussed in the next section, Hazen Paper may still have a
disastrous effect on the model, because RFOA rather than a
126. 507 U.S. at 610.
127. Id (citing Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
128. See ScHLEi & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 497-98. Some courts require
that the plaintiff show some connection between the employment action and the
plaintiff's age, such as showing that the employer replaced the plaintiff with
someone outside the protected age group or at least someone younger. Id at 498.
129. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, Rehnquist, & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring). See supra note 15 and discussion infra part V.C.
130. Some courts have held that the theory applied to the ADEA. See, e.g.,
Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1992); Shutt v. Sandoz Crop
Protection Corp., 934 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1991); MacPherson v. University of
Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766 (11th Cir. 1991); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912
F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986);
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983). Other
circuits have merely assumed without deciding that the theory applied to the
ADEA. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1428 (10th Cir.
1993); Fisher v. Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.3 (7th Cir.
1992); Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Akins
v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.1984); Massarsky v. General
Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 42:1
A GE DISCRIMINATION
business necessity may be the defense to a disparate impact case
under the ADEA. 3'
Hazen Paper appears to have foreclosed the argument that the
employer should be required to justify age-correlated criterion for
disparate treatment purposes, and the lower courts have generally
so held.132 For disparate impact claims, any factor other than age,
however, should not be a defense.
If RFOA were also a defense to disparate impact, Hazen Paper's
tacit interpretatin of RFOA would eliminate the disparate impact
theory for ADEA purposes."' An examination of the disparate
impact theory generally and its applicability to the ADEA is
appropriate at this point.
V. DISPARATE IMPACT
A. Generally
1. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Supreme Court's decision in -Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,"' which substantially weakened the disparate impact model
of discrimination, was the principal driving force for enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.135 Because the amendments to Title
VII in this regard did not include the ADEA specifically, the law
that applied to Title VII before the 1991 Act, in all probability,
applies to the ADEA.136 It is important at this point to look at the
disparate impact model before Congress passed the 1991 Act,
including the changes that Wards Cove made in the existing law.
The usual method of proof of disparate impact is statistical. The
131. See discussion infra part V.D.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
133. See infra text part V.D.
134. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (superseded in part by statute).
135. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
136. This is assuming that the disparate impact theory actually applies to the
ADEA, which will be discussed later. See infra part V.C.
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plaintiff must present a prima facie case using statistics to show that
an employment criterion screens out, for example, significantly
more blacks than whites. 137 "The evidence in these 'disparate
impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than
specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those
disparities."13
The plaintiff's statistics must meet certain standards in order to
establish a prima facie case. First, the disparity has to be statistically
significant.' The Supreme Court has never approved a specific test
but has adverted to two tests commonly used by the lower courts,
the four-fifths or eighty percent rule'" and a rule using standard
deviations.' 4'
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission set forth the
four-fifths or eighty percent rule in guidelines on selection criteria,
which said that in order to be statistically significant, the selection
rate of the plaintiff's group must be less than four-fifths the
selection rate of the group with the highest selection rate.4 The
Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. United States set
forth the standard deviation rule, which considers a statistical
disparity greater than two or three standard deviations statistically
significant. 43 The Court has also made it clear that in order to
137. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
138. Id at 987.
139. See ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 98-99; see, e.g., Finch v.
Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Del. 1994) (holding that a difference of
between 2.16 and 2.68 standard deviations is sufficiently significant to support
a prima facie case).
140. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 444 n.4 (1982).
141. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977).
142. EEOC Selection Guideines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1994).
143. 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977)). This case was a pattern and practice suit rather than disparate impact.
Although it has never been clear whether the disparity has to be greater in order
to prove pattern and practice, this measure has been used in disparate impact
cases. See Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, Metro. Fire Dep't, 26 F.3d
1545, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994); Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir.
1991); Cooper v. University of Texas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 196 (N.D. Tex. 1979),
affd, 648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981).
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satisfy the prima facie case, the plaintiff must compare the selection
rate of her class to the proper group in terms of qualifications and
labor market.1" In addition, In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,45
the Supreme Court added that in proving a prima facie case, the
plaintiff could not rely on the disparate impact of the total selection
process but would have to identify the criterion that was causing
the disparate impact. 46
At this point, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
justify the practice by proving that business necessity was cause for
the criterion.147 Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, proof of
business necessity usually required at least that the employer prove
that the employment criterion was job-related, that is, that the
criterion predicted success in the job. 148 The EEOC Selection
Guidelines provided that the employer must validate employment
criteria by one of three statistical methods. 49
144. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308.
145. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (superseded in part by statute).
146. This was a broader reading of the law in jurisdictions that did not allow
the plaintiff to attack a total selection process at all, but a more restrictive
interpretation in those jurisdictions that allowed such an attack without selecting
the criterion that caused the disparity. See Eglit, supra note 28, at 1132-33.
147. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See generally
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972); Martha
Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions ofEquality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact
Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principe, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983).
148. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 112-14.
149. EEOC Selection Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (1994).
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a
criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical data
demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or
significantly correlated with important elements of job
performance.... Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection
procedure by a content validity study should consist of data showing
that the content of the selection procedure is representative of
important aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates
are to be evaluated... Evidence of validity of a test or other selection
procedure through a construct validity study should consist of data
showing that the procedure measures the degree to which candidates
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The Supreme Court has not provided a well-defined meaning of
business necessity. 5' In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"' in which the
Supreme Court first articulated the disparate impact theory, the
Court ruled the employer had to prove "business necessity,"152 and
that the employer had to show a "manifest relationship to the
employment in question.""5 3 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 54 the
Court discussed the EEOC's Selection Guidelines:
The message of these Guidelines is the same as that of
the Griggs case - that discriminatory tests are impermissible
unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be
"predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant
have identifiable characteristics which have been determined to be
important in successful performance in the job for which the candidates
are to be evaluated.
Id 1607.5(B).
150. See PLAYER ET AL., supra note 31, S 5.41(c).
151. 401 U.S. at 424.
152. Id at 431.
153. Id at 432; see also Philip S. Runkel, Note, The CivilRights Act of 1991:
A Continuation ofthe Wards Cove Standard ofBusiness Necessity? 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1177 (1994) in which the author identified "five different formulations
of the required nexus between the business practice and job performance" found
in Griggs:
(1) "standard is shown to be significantly related to successful job
performance;"
(2) "neither ... requirement .. .is shown to bear a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it is used;"
(3) "[wlhat Congress has forbidden is giving these deices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance;"
(4) "if an employment practice... cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited;" and
(5) "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that
any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question."
I'd at 1182-83 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426, 431-32, 436) (emphasis omitted)).
154. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated.""' s
In a later case, New York City Transit Autbority v. Beazer,'56 the
Supreme Court allowed the city to refuse to employ methadone
users in transit jobs, because the goals of safety and efficiency were
"significantly served" and that the rule bore a "'manifest
relationship to the employment in question.'"15 Unlike the
Albemarle case, the Court did not require much in the way of proof
that business necessity required the rule. 58 Thus, the Court at this
point had sent mixed signals regarding the meaning of business
necessity.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio5 9 is the Supreme Court's
latest pronouncement regarding the employer's burden of proof.
The Court indicated in Wards Cove that the employer's burden of
proof was not as onerous as most courts had previously construed
it to be.
[A]t the justification stage . . . the dispositive issue is
whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way,
the legitimate employment goals of the employer .... A
mere insubstantial justification ... will not suffice ....
[T]here is no requirement that the challenged practice be
"essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's business for
it to pass muster .... 60
Even before Wards Cove, the lower courts had been unable to
agree on a definition of business necessity, beyond the fact that the
criterion must be job-related. Some courts held the employer to a
strict standard of proving that the criterion was job-related and
155. Id at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1994)).
156. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
157. Id at 587 n.31 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
158. Id at 587.
159. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
160. Id at 659 (citations omitted).
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essential to the business.' 6' Others used "less demanding
standards." 6 ' Some courts required only the manifest relationship
between the employer's criterion and success in the job, as
articulated in Beazer.'63 Most courts, however, interpreted Beazer to
apply only to safety situations. 64 Some consensus had developed
that proof of business necessity required proof that the employer's
criterion predicted success in important aspects of the job.'
Before the Supreme Court decided Wards Cove,6' most lower
courts required the employer to bear the burden of proof and
persuasion once the plaintiff proved a prima facie case.' The
Supreme Court announced in Wards Cove that the burden of
persuasion should remain at all times on the plaintiff.'68 At this
point if the employer can meet its burden of proving business
necessity, the employee has one last chance to prevail if he can
suggest an alternative selection criterion that has a less disparate
impact.' As a final blow to the disparate impact theory, the
Supreme Court ruled in Wards Cove that the plaintiff would only
161. Eglit, supra note 28, at 1131-32. The Supreme Court reinforced this
standard in a footnote in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977).
162. Eglit, supra note 28, at 1132 & n.141.
163. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31
(1979).
164. Eglit, supra note 28, at 1131 & n.136.
165. See, e.g., Foster v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 872 F.2d 1563, 1569 (11th
Cir. 1989); Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. California Counties Joint
Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 833 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1130-31
(D. Del. 1994) (holding in an ADEA case that defendant must produce evidence
of a business justification, which consists of a showing "both of its legitimate
employment goal and evidence of how the challenged practice significantly serves
that goal"); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 481 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (E.D.
Wis. 1979).
166. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
167. Eglit, supra note 28, at 1129-30.
168. In fact it is clear that the lower courts had not misinterpreted the
allocation of proof, rather the Supreme Court was overruling prior caselaw in
this regard, although it would not say so. Eglit, supra note 28, at 1129 n.124,
1190.
169. See PLAYER ET AL., supra note 31, § 5.41(d)(5).
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win at this stage if the employer refused the suggested alternative.170
In sum, Wards Cove made a disparate impact case more difficult
to prove principally by (1) requiring the plaintiff to identify the
criterion causing the disparate impact, 7' (2) requiring the employer
simply to articulate its defense rather than to bear the burden of
persuasion,' and (3) requiring the employer to show only that the
criterion having the disparate impact significantly serves the
employer's employment and need not be essential to the business.'73
2. After the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Wards Cove served as a primary reason for passage of the 1991
Civil Rights Act. The Statement of Congressional Findings in the
Act states that "the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio has weakened the scope and effectiveness of
Federal civil rights protections." 4 Congress then codified the
170. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661.
171. Id at 657-58.
172. Id at 659 ("[T]he Court stated that "the employer carries the burden of
producing evidence of a business justification for his employment practice. The
burden of persuasion, however, remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff.").
173. See supra text accompanying note 160. Wards Cove also added more to
the requirement of alternative business practice:
Of course, any alternative practices which respondents offer up in this
respect must be equally effective as petitioners' chosen hiring
procedures in achieving petitioners' legitimate employment goals.
Moreover, "[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed
alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they
would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving the
employer's legitimate business goals."
Id at 661 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988)
(O'Connor, J.). In addition, in order for the plaintiff to prevail at this point, the
defendant must "refuse to adopt these alternatives." Id at 660-61.
174. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(emphasis added). The Act states in part:
S 2. Findings
The Congress finds that -
(1) additional remedies under Federal Law are needed to deter
unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
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disparate impact test and clarified the burden of proof. Once the
plaintiff has shown disparate impact, the employer must bear the
burden of proof and persuasion in showing that the practice is "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity." 5 It is not at all clear what Congress intended by adding
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil
rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against
unlawful discrimination in employment.
Id (citation omitted).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993) states in part:
(1) (A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact
is established under this subchapter only if -
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice
and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment
practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i),
the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one
employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be
required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business
necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be
in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to
the concept of "alternative employment practice."
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by
business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of
intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
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this definition. The consternation is further exacerbated by
Congress' inclusion of a memorandum in the legislation, which
indicated that Congress' sole intent regarding business necessity was
to return to the law before Wards Cove, and that other legislative
history had no effect.176 Thus, because the law was not at all clear
before Wards Cove, the memorandum is not very helpful Y7
Congress also added the requirement, derived from Wards Cove,
that the plaintiff must identify the particular employment practice.
Furthermore, if the case proceeds to the third stage in which the
plaintiff must show an alternative business practice, the plaintiff
may only prevail if the employer refuses to adopt the alternative
practice. 8
B. Effect of the 1991 Act on Disparate Impact and the ADEA
With regard to Title VII, the 1991 Civil Rights Act made
substantial changes in the law as it stood on the date of the Wards
Cove decision. The implications of the changes for the ADEA are
not so clear. Professor Howard Eglit discusses the possibilities at
length in an excellent article, in which he notes that scant legislative
history guides the resolution.7 9 Because the task of this Article is
not to cover the same ground as Professor Eglit, a brief summary
of his conclusions will suffice for the purposes of this Article. One
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(m) (Supp. V. 1993) states that "[t]he term 'demonstrate'
means meets the burden of production and persuasion."
176.42 U.S.C. S 1981, note, Legislative History for 1991 Amendment (Supp.
V. 1993). "No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at
Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be
considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history
in construing or applying, any provision of this Act... that relates to Wards
Cove - Business necessity/ cumulation/ alternative business practice." Id
177. The memorandum states that "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'job
related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.... and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior
to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio." INTERPRETIVE MEMORANDUM, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 767.
178. See supra note 175.
179. See Eglit, supra note 28, at 1127.
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possibility considered by Professor Eglit is that Congress did not
think it was necessary to amend the ADEA, because the cases
Congress intended to overrule were Title VII cases. This is not very
likely, Eglit concluded, because the ADEA clearly follows Title VII
jurisprudence. 8 ' The fact that Congress amended the ADEA in
other parts of the Act also weighs against this conclusion.18
If Congress did not overlook the ADEA, the question arises of
why Congress chose to leave the ADEA at the mercy of Wards
Cove, particularly in light of the statement that the case had
weakened the protections of federal civil rights laws. 82 Whatever
the reason, Professor Eglit concluded that, unless the Supreme
Court abandons Wards Cove or Congress amends the ADEA,
Wards Cove applies.183
Other than the possibility that Congress merely overlooked the
ADEA, which Professor Eglit discounts, there is at least one other
explanation. At the time Congress passed the 1991 Act, the courts
did not agree on how, and indeed whether, the disparate impact
theory applied to the ADEA.'" Some lower courts, commentators,
and members of the Supreme Court had already expressed
180. Eglit, supra note 28, at 1174-75.
181. See Eglit, supra note 28, at 1106-25.
182. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 103 Stat. 1071.
183. Eglit, supra note 28, at 1215. Congress expressed such serious
disapproval of Wards Cove, that courts should now consider the case too
seriously undermined to continue to rely on it. Indeed, some courts have treated
the applicability of the 1991 Act to the ADEA in this regard as an open question.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th Cir.
1992); Leidig v. Honeywell, 850 F. Supp. 796, 802 n.5 (D. Minn. 1994). Others
have expressed doubt, but they did not have to decide the issue and left it open.
See, e.g., Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1429 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993);
Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 1574, 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1994). At
least one district court has said that the 1991 Act does not apply to the ADEA,
because disparate impact does not comport with the ADEA. Martincic v. Urban
Redevelopment Auth., 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (W.D. Pa. 1994). The court
appeared to object to the foundation of the disparate impact theory, that the
employer could be guilty of discriminating without intending to discriminate.
Id
184. See discussion supra part V.C.
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reservations about the application of the disparate impact theory to
the ADEA, s85 so amending the ADEA may not have been an issue
worth adding to the battle for passage of the 1991 Act.186
Furthermore, it may be argued that the defense to a disparate
impact claim under the ADEA is not a business necessity but a
"reasonable factor other than age."'87 Additionally, amending the
ADEA in other respects, such as mixed motive,"' would have
necessitated defending the omission of the ADEA from the
disparate impact provisions of the 1991 Act."
For whatever reason, Congress did not include the ADEA
specifically in the substantive amendments to Title VII, and the
argument that the ADEA can take advantage of the 1991 Act's
amendments regarding disparate impact is not compelling. The
ADEA, then, has as its model of proof the much-weakened version
of the disparate impact model articulated in Wards Cove.
Applying the disparate impact theory to the ADEA produces
other problems. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,9 discussed above,
the Supreme Court raised a red flag by stating that it has never
decided whether disparate impact applies at all in ADEA cases.' 1
Additionally, in a concurrence, several members of the Court
referred to "substantial arguments" as to why disparate impact
185. See infra notes 222-24.
186. This is especially likely because the law had been vetoed in the previous
year and Congress had failed to override the veto. The Act passed only after
much compromising. See Lilling, supra note 41, at 219-20. In addition, the 1991
Civil Rights Act limits jury trials to disparate treatment claims, while jury trials
are available for all ADEA claims. Thus, if the ADEA had been expressly
included in the 1991 Act's codification of the disparate impact model, jury trials
would have been available in disparate impact cases under the ADEA, but not
under Title VII. See infra note 189.
187. Player, supra note 64, at 1278-83.
188. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
189. In addition, because the remedies are more generous under the ADEA
and jury trials have always been available, 29 U.S.C. S 626(b)-(c) (1988), no
strong reason exists to add the ADEA to the compensatory and punitive damages
provisions of the 1991 Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. V 1993).
190. 507 U.S. 604 (1993); see supra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
191. 507 U.S. at 610.
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should not apply in ADEA cases, citing an earlier dissent to a denial
of certiorari in which Justice Rehnquist expressed that same
opinion."2The question arises, then, whether disparate impact
applies to the ADEA. Because Hazen Paper may have signaled a
change in whether the disparate impact theory applies to the
ADEA and, if so, how, the inquiry at this point proceeds into the
law before and after Hazen Paper.
C. The Applicability of the Disparate Impact Model to the ADEA
1. Legislative History
a. Generally
Congress took word-for-word from Title VII the statutory
language of the ADEA that prohibits discrimination. 93 The
question, then, is: Did Congress intend that the disparate impact
theory that applies to Title VII be incorporated into the ADEA?
Professor Steven Kaminshine 9 4 and Professor Alfred Blumrosen 9"
have written excellent articles on the legislative intent regarding
disparate impact and the ADEA, coming to opposite conclusions.
Professor Kaminshine surveyed the legislative history and found no
substantial support for the proposition that Congress intended to
foreclose disparate impact as a theory of liability for the ADEA.'"
Professor Kaminshine determined that Congress had been anxious
that employers consider older people based upon their abilities and
not upon stereotyped views of the effects of the aging process.
Therefore, Professor Kaminshine argued that the legislative history
is consistent with the view that Congress did not intend to allow
employers to use age-correlated criterion that did not relate to
192. Id at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S.
945 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
193. See supra note 27 (comparing the texts of the two acts).
194. Kaminshine, supra note 25.
195. BLUMROSEN, supra note 25.




Professor Blumrosen exhaustively surveyed the legislative
history and found that Congress had identified two types of
discrimination against older people: the setting of arbitrary age
limits, and other practices that disadvantaged older people.' 9 His
conclusion was that in enacting the ADEA, Congress had intended
to prohibit the setting of arbitrary age limits, which would require
intentional discrimination. With regard to the other practices that
disadvantaged older people, Professor Kaminshine concluded that
Congress intended to deal with those factors in other ways. 99
Professor Kaminshine's response is that this analysis does not
explain why Congress did not add anything about prohibiting only
arbitrary age limits, but rather copied the broad Title VII
proscriptions.2°
Apart from Professor Kaminshine's conclusion, at the time the
ADEA was enacted, employment discrimination law was in its
infancy. It is difficult to discern a congressional intent with regard
to a theory that had not been articulated at that time.2"' Therefore,
197. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 288-89.
198. BLUMROSEN, supra note 25, at 85.
199. BLUMRoSEN, supra note 25, at 85.
200. Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 299. See Eglit, supra note 30, at 221-23, for
the view that Congress meant to include practices that commonly have a
disparate impact on older people as "arbitrary" age discrimination. Professor
Eglit acknowledges that Congress did find age discrimination to be different from
race discrimination. However, the "fact that an employer does not overtly rely
upon age as a basis for decisionmaking does not necessarily diminish the
opportunity for inflicting harm.... Age distinctions are particularly unique
because they so often are used thoughtlessly rather than as intentional
expressions of invidious malice or even mildly bigoted intent." IaL at 222.
201. The first articulations of the objective theory of discrimination
appeared in law review articles after 1967. See BLuMRosEN, supra note 25, at 71
(citing George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and
Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969); ALFREDW. BLUMRoSEN, THE DUTY
OF FAIR RECRUiTMENT UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1968); Alfred
W. Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer ofHope,
23 RUTGERS L. REV. 268 (1969)); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), in which the Supreme Court articulated the disparate impact theory, was
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to ask whether Congress intended to include disparate impact as a
theory for the ADEA is to ask the same question as whether
Congress intended to include the disparate impact theory for Title
VII. 202 Professor Blumrosen has the best answer to the Title VII
question. Much of this answer would apply as well to the ADEA
question, although Professor Blumrosen himself would not agree:23
The statute [Title VII] can be read either as requiring
"intent" or as prohibiting practices with "adverse effect."
The standard definition of discrimination in the legislative
debate, a "distinction in treatment given to different
individuals because of their different race" did not address
the question of whether the difference had to be intended.
The "impact" concept was consistent with the
Congressional purpose to "lift the Negro from the status of
inequality to one of equality of treatment."
. . . To implement the Act, [Congress] created an
agency which had to interpret the statute in order to engage
in investigation and conciliation. It is conventional law that
the interpretations of the agency are to be given deference
not decided until 1971. Professor Gold contended that "adverse impact, like
Pallas Athena from Zeus, sprang full grown from the mind of the Supreme
Court," while Professor Blumrosen, as well as Schlei and Grossman, contended
that several cases foreshadowed the Court's adoption of the theory. Michael E.
Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for
Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. Lj. 429, 479 n. 170 (1985) (citing SCHLEI & GROSSMAN,
supra note 39, at 5 n.12 (2d ed. 1983); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. REv. 59, 71 n.46 (1972)).
202. Compare Gold, supra note 201, with Alfred W. Blumrosen, Griggs Was
Correctly Decided - A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. Lj. 443 (1986), and
Katherine J. Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972
-A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 105 (1986).
203. Professor Blumrosen would probably not agree that the answer is the
same, because he does not believe that disparate impact applies to the ADEA and
that racial discrimination was viewed differently by Congress than age
discrimination. BLUMROSEN, supra note 25, at 79, 85-86,
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by the courts if they are "permissible," or reasonable
interpretations of the statute. In Griggs, the government
argued for a "disparate impact" interpretation, and for a "job
relatedness" requirement with respect to testing. The Court
accepted the government's argument, fully aware that the
agencies had consciously adopted a "broad" interpretation
of the statute. Thus, it appears that Griggs was correctly
decided under the 1964 Act.2
The strongest argument for applying the disparate impact
theory is the fact that Congress took section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA
directly from the section of Title VII, section 703(a)(2),205 that
prohibits practices having a disparate impact.20 6 It is illogical to say
that the same provision means something different under the
ADEA than it means under Title VII, absent clear legislative intent
to the contrary. 7 This is especially true here because the legislative
history is inconclusive in this regard.20 8 However, the most
204. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective
Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1987) (citations omitted).
The EEOC regulations provide in part:
When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the
grounds that it is a "factor other than" age, and such a practice has an
adverse impact on individuals within the protected age group, it can
only be justified as a business necessity.
ADEA, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1995).
205. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(2).(1988).
206. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 44647 (1982); Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337-38
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
137 (1976); see infra text accompanying note 242.
207. Professor Blunirosen used the fact that intentional discrimination was
the only kind of discrimination clearly identified at the time the ADEA was
enacted as a point in favor of his view that the ADEA only prohibits intentional
discrimination. See BLUMROSEN, supra note 25, at 97.
208. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. The final rationale cited
in Justice Rehnquist's dissent from denial of certiorari in Markham v. Geller, 635
F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981), and in the Stanford
casenote cited in the Hazen Paper concurrence, is the assertion, discussed above,
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compelling argument that disparate impact does not apply is that
the inclusion of the RFOA defense in the ADEA precludes the use
of a disparate impact claim." 9
b. Does RFOA Preclude Disparate Impact?
As discussed above, the legislative history does not compel any
conclusion regarding the applicability of the disparate impact model
to the ADEA.20 The most likely, conclusion, however, is that
Congress added the defense of RFOA to allow the employer to use
factors that had a disparate impact but which were nevertheless
justifiable.
In his article on the legislative history of the ADEA, Professor
Kaminshine's general conclusion is that Congress was concerned
with employees and employers. Allowing the employer to make
termination decisions based on reasonable factors other than age,
indicates congressional concern that employers should not be
forced to retain employees who cannot perform. On the other
hand, Congress was also concerned about the factors that cause
older employees to lose their jobs and make it difficult for them to
find re-employment. Therefore, a balance should be struck by
requiring the employer to justify factors that have a disparate
impact on older employees. Employers should ideally be required
to justify the use of age-correlated factors as the affirmative defense
of RFOA. If Hazen Paper has indeed reduced the RFOA defense to
any factor other than age, the employer should make the
justification as part of the defense to a disparate impact case by
showing that criteria that have a disparate impact significantly serve
the employer's employment goals. This is the defense to disparate
impact that apparently applies to the ADEA, as articulated by
that the RFOA defense precludes the disparate impact theory in ADEA cases.
Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REv. 837, 844-48 (1982).
209. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 301-06; Eglit, supra note 30, at 217.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 193-200.
211. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 288-98.
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Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."'
To assume that Congress could have foreseen the development
of the disparate impact theory and that it in turn intended to
foreclose the theory for the ADEA by inserting the defense of
RFOA, is to attribute greater powers of prophecy to Congress than
it likely possessed. If Congress did intend to preclude disparate
impact cases under the ADEA, it would have made a clear
statement to that effect, instead of adopting into the ADEA the
provision, taken from Title VII, from which the disparate impact
theory was derived. Likewise, Congress would probably not have
used the term "reasonable," but rather would have used the "any
factor other than age" terminology. Such wording would have been
consistent with the RFOA defense's probable source, the defense
of "any other factor other than sex" from the Equal Pay Act.213 As
discussed earlier, Congress must have meant something more than
the notion that any factor other than age could be a defense.14
A simple, common sense view, rather than a dissection of the
legislative history, indicates that Congress did not intend to allow
employers to use unjustified criteria that strongly correlate with age
to discharge older employees. The lower courts were generally in
accord on'this point until the decision in Hazen Paper.215 In
addition, most courts applied the disparate impact theory to the
ADEA before Hazen Paper.216
212. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (superseded in part by statute).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
Most courts require "other factors other than sex" to be related to employer
concerns, see PLAYER ET AL., supra note 31, at 419, which is not that different
from the Wards Cove definition of business necessity. See supra text
accompanying note 160. Therefore, the "factor other than sex" defense would
not preclude disparate impact compensation claims under Title VII in any event.
See PLAYER ET AL., supra note 31, at 419.
215. See cases cited supra note 105.
216. See cases cited supra note 130.
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2. Judicial Decisions
Before the 1991 Act, the courts interpreted Title VII and the
ADEA in pari materia.217 The courts generally have applied the
legal principles developed under Title VII, such as the allocation of
proof in a disparate treatment case articulated in McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, to the ADEA.218 The courts were slower to apply Title
VII's disparate impact theory to the ADEA. Although a majority
of the circuits eventually did so, 219 dissenting arguments persist.
Most recently, concurring in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,"0 Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
"[wrote] to underscore" that disparate impact was not an issue in
that case. The concurrence then discussed the "substantial
arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact
analysis from Title VII to the ADEA."2' The support for this claim
is Justice Rehnquist's dissent from denial of certiorari in a prior
case,m a student note in the StanfordLaw Review," ' and the dissent
in a lower court case.? 4
In 1981, Justice Rehnquist dissented from the denial of
217. Seesupra text accompanying note 31; Eglit, supra note 28, at 1096-1101.
218. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at
497-98.
219. See cases cited supra note 130.
220. 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
221. Id at 618.
222. Markham v. Geller, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
945 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
223. See Krop, supra note 208.
224. The dissent in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting), cited in Justice Kennedy's concurrence, was a
disparate treatment case. The majority decided that the employer had
discriminated. The dissent argued that the majority had reached its conclusion
by confusing the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories and
questioned whether the employer discriminated even in applying the disparate
impact theory. Id at 1216-20. In the explication of its opinion, the dissent




certiorari in Markham v. GellerY5 In Markham, the lower court
ruled that a policy of refusing to hire teachers with more than five
years of experience had a disparate impact on teachers over forty.
Justice Rehnquist noted that "[t]his Court has never held that proof
of discriminatory impact can establish a violation of the ADEA."26
He insisted that because the policy made no reference to age, it
could not violate the ADEA,' citing two bases for this conclusion:
(1) the first part of the anti-discrimination provision contained in
the ADEA, section 4(a)(1), which provides that it is unlawful "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual" or to
discriminate with regard to any term or condition of employment
because of age;2 8 and (2) the ADEA's defense of "reasonable factors
other than age." 2
29
Whether the RFOA defense precludes disparate impact is a
concern that was discussed above; however, Justice Rehnquist's
citation of section 4(a)(1) as support for the proposition that the
ADEA permits policies that have a disparate impact was clearly
disingenuous. Section 4 (a)(1) of the ADEA prohibits the employer
from discriminating in hiring or discharge or terms and conditions
of employment on the basis of age." The section is virtually
identical to its counterpart in Title VII, section 703(a) (1).231
Congress not only prohibited these specific forms of
discrimination in both Title VII and the ADEA, but Congress also
added section 4(a)(2)2 2 as a further provision, borrowed from Title
VII's section 703(a)(2), 3 stating that it is also an illegal practice "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
225. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
226. 451 U.S. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 947.
228. 1ad (citing 29 U.S.C. 5 623(a)(1) (1988)).
229. Id at 949 (citing 29 U.S.C. 5 623(0(1) (1988)).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1) (1988).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
232. 29 U.S.C. S 623(a)(2) (1988).
233. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988).
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opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age." 234 In General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert235 and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,236 the Supreme
Court first identified section 703 (a) (2), the Title VII counterpart to
section 4(a)(2), as the statutory basis for the disparate impact
theory. The Court had first articulated the disparate impact theory
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,37 without a statutory reference.23
In a later development, the Supreme Court, albeit in a bit of
revisionist history, clearly revealed in Connecticut v. Teal 39 that
section 703(a) (2) had been the basis for the Court's articulation of
the disparate impact theory in Griggs.24 Again, it defies logic that
virtually the identical provision of the ADEA, section 4(a)(2), does
not also prohibit policies that have a disparate impact on people in
the protected age group.
The second support for Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins was a casenote written in 1982, which is largely
outdated, given subsequent changes in the law.241 The note asserts
that the disparate impact theory is not appropriate under the
ADEA. One of the reasons the author cites is that Title VII cases
should only be authoritative for the ADEA when such cases
involve a statutory provision having a counterpart in the ADEA.242
234. 29 U.S.C. S 623(a)(2).
235. 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976).
236. 434 U.S. 136, 141 (1977).
237. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
239. 457 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1982).
240. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In fact, the Court had
not indicated that it was interpreting any particular part of Title VII, but only
that the "Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id at 431.
241. Krop, supra note 208.
242. Krop, supra note 208, at 841-42. At that time, the statutory basis for
disparate impact in Title VII had been identified, although, perhaps, only in
passing. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976). See supra text
accompanying notes 234-40. Shortly after the note was written, however, the
Supreme Court clearly found statutory support for the disparate impact theory
in S 703(a)(2). The note was published in April 1982, before the June 1992
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As set forth above, the Supreme Court itself clearly found support
for the disparate impact theory for Title VII in the language of
section 703(a)(2),243 which is virtually identical to language found in
section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.2 4
The casenote also argues that Griggs proscribed lifelong
discrimination, and because these workers have not always been
discriminated against, the disparate impact theory should not apply.
Inherent in this argument is that age discrimination is not very
reprehensible.245 This is contrary to Congress' findings when it
enacted the ADEA.
The justification for the ADEA is set out in the legislation:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to
retain employment, and especially to regain employment
when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential
for job performance has become a common practice, and
otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage
of the older person...
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale,
and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages,
high among older workers; their numbers are great and
growing; and their employment problems are grave.246
decision in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1982), which explicitly
identified the statutory basis for disparate impact.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988).
244. 29 U.S.C. S 623(a)(2) (1988).
245. Krop's note also makes the argument that Congress recognized that
some generalizations about age were correct, because the ADEA has an upper age
limit of seventy. See Krop, supra note 208, at 850-53. However, Congress
subsequently recognized that assuming incapacity at seventy was wrong and
amended the Act to eliminate the upper age limit. Age Discrimination in
Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, S 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342,
3344.
246. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Two articles detail the
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Congress did not consider age discrimination a substantially less
serious problem than other kinds of discrimination. Furthermore,
the second rationale set out above supports the disparate impact
theory in that Congress intended to proscribe practices that were
"otherwise desirable practices [that] may work to the disadvantage
of older persons."247 Some commentators have distinguished the
need for the disparate impact theory under Title VII as opposed to
the ADEA, because race discrimination is motivated by hatred and
ill will, while age discrimination is based on stereotyping and
ignorance." This does not explain why sex discrimination, which
is also largely based on ignorance and stereotyping, is treated the
same as race discrimination,249 and why the disparate impact theory
applies without question in Title VII sex discrimination cases.250 In
addition, disparate impact is the only current theory that will detect
subconscious discrimination.2 1
legislative history. of the ADEA and seek to ascertain the intent of the Congress
with regard to disparate impact. The authors reach opposite conclusions. See
supra text accompanying notes 194-200.
247. Section 621(a)(2). But see BLUMROSEN, supra note 25, at 85-86, for
another view of this language.
Some commentators have cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam), for
the proposition that age discrimination is not sufficiently heinous to be
constitutionally protected. See Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 306-08. In enacting
the ADEA, Congress made a contrary decision that age discrimination has a
sufficiently deleterious effect on older people and the economy. 29 U.S.C. § 621
(1988).
248. See Krop, supra note 208, at 82. Considering the timing of these
expressions regarding the ADEA, they may be driven in part by the fact that the
overriding concern at the time was race discrimination. Age discrimination at
that time largely protected the rights of white males. See BLUVROSEN, supra note
25, at 105-06.
249. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988); Anita Cava,
Taking Judicial Notice ofSexual Stereotyping, 43 ARK. L. REV. 27 (1990).
250. See PLAYER ET AL., supra note 31, at 251.
251. See Charles R. Lawrence II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (proof of
discriminatory intent does not cure the problem of workplace discrimination,
which is a by-product of societal discrimination, largely brought about by
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Discrimination is treating one person in a protected group
differently from a person in another group because of the protected
characteristic and has nothing to do with ill will, in the sense of evil
motive. The motivation is irrelevant for liability purposes, in any
event, whether based on ignorance, stereotyping, unconscious
discrimination, inadvertence, or hatred and ill will. 52
Since Hazen Paper, lower courts have continued to apply
disparate impact but are less sure of whether it applies.253 As set out
above, disparate impact should logically apply to ADEA cases. It
may be more important now that disparate impact be applied to the
ADEA, because of the Court's holding in Hazen Paper that
employers do not violate the ADEA in disparate treatment cases by
using criteria that have a disparate impact.254 As noted above, this
unconscious discrimination); David B. Oppenheimer, supra note 41. Professor
Oppenheimer suggests that because most discrimination is unintentional, a better
theory of discrimination would be based on negligence, rather than intent. Id, at
899. This being the case, the disparate impact theory would more effectively
eradicate soci'etal discrimination, including age discrimination. See also
Blumrosen, supra note 145; Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See: White
Race Consciousness and the Requirement ofDiscriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 953 (1993); D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and
Title VII, 45 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1992); Pamela S. Karlan, Discriminatory Purpose
andMensRea The TorturedArgument ofInvidiouslntent, 93 YALELJ. 111 (1983);
Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment
Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 759-62 (1987).
252. See Judith J. Johnson, A Standardfor Punitive Damages under Title VII,
46 FLA. L. REV. 521, 534-44 (1994).
253. See, e.g., Leidig v. Honeywell, 850 F. Supp. 796, 801 (D. Minn. 1994);
Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, 870 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1994), ajJ'd, 67 F.3d
291 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 772 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n.2
(9th Cir. 1992). Contra Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2577 (1995) (holding that RFOA precludes disparate impact under the
ADEA); Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1076-77
(W.D. Pa. 1994) (acknowledging being bound by precedent, court was
"convinced [that] disparate impact is not a cognizible claim under the ADEA").
254. In DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995), the court went into great detail acknowledging the
doubt that Hazen Paper cast on the disparate impact theory and the validity of
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holding has left a gap in the rationale of the ADEA between BFOQ
and RFOA, through which all but the most blatant age
discrimination will fall. Applying the disparate impact theory to
the ADEA, requiring employers to justify by business necessity the
use of age-correlated factors, will preserve a rational scheme for the
ADEA. However, whether business necessity is the defense to a
disparate impact case under ADEA has been questioned.
D. If the Disparate Impact Theory Does Apply to the ADEA, Is the
Defense RFOA or Business Necessity?
Before Hazen Paper, a majority of the courts of appeal applied
the disparate impact model to the ADEA and used the Griggs
allocation of proof.255 Under Griggs, if the plaintiff proves a prima
the reasons for not applying the theory to the ADEA. Id at 725-29. The court
ultimately refused to apply the disparate impact theory for other reasons. Id at
727; see also Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Professional Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135,
140 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995).
In Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 60 F.3d 809 (unpublished opinion), available
in No. 95-1046, 1995 WL 414831 (1st Cir. 1995), the court affirmed the lower
court's decision that, although the plaintiff showed that the defendant's criteria
for layoff affected thirty-nine percent of the employees over fifty and only 9%
younger than 50, the criteria "measured skills and job behaviors necessary for,
and significantly correlated with, successful performance of the jobs in question."
Id at *3. In addition to a footnote citing the doubt Hazen Paper cast on the
applicability of the disparate impact theory to the ADEA, id at *5 n.1, the court
which clarified its interpretation of the law that the employer is not required to
validate selection procedures. Id at *5 n.3.
In Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 1574, 1578 (N.D. Ala. 1994),
the court stated that "the plaintiff has from the outset a heavy burden of
persuading the court to find the existence of liability under a theory that the
Supreme Court has explicitly stated it has not yet accepted." The court,
acknowledging that the policy of reducing benefits impacted older employees
more severely, said that such practices that are so "'tenuously related to
discrimination, so remote from the objectives of civil rights law, do not reach the
prima facie threshold.'" Id at 1579 (citing Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, 967
F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1992)).




facie case, the employer bears the burden of proving business
necessity.256
Professor Player was a leading and early proponent of the idea
that in a disparate impact case under the ADEA, the defendant does
not have to prove business necessity but rather RFOA. 7 Professor
Player's assumption, however, was that factors that are "inherently
time-based, such as experience, years on the job, and tenure... are
inherently age-related and thus cannot be considered 'factors other
than age.'"" Because of the Supreme Court's tacit interpretation of
RFOA in Hazen Paper, Professor Player's assumption regarding the
meaning of RFOA may no longer be valid laws. In any event, few
courts have said that RFOA is the defense to disparate impact cases
under the ADEA. 9 This defense to disparate impact cases under
the ADEA, therefore, has not and should not be generally accepted.
The fact that courts assume that Burdine-McDonnell Douglas260
applies to ADEA pretext cases in the same way that it applies to
Title VII provides an argument that the presence of the RFOA
256. 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 ("If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited.... Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment
in question.).
257. See Player, supra note 64, at 1278-83.
258. Player, supra note 64, at 1278.
259. See, e.g., EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927
(D. Cal. 1995). In Newport Mesa the charging party was not hired, because her
experience entitled her to a greater salary than the person hired. Id at 929. The
court determined that the defense to disparate impact cases under the ADEA was
RFOA, and that the policy of hiring based on salary costs is an RFOA. The
court ruled the employer could not use such a policy if it was a proxy or pretext
for age discrimination. Id at 932. The court rejected the argument that RFOA
should be construed the same as business necessity, saying that RFOA required
less of a showing. The employer's justification for the policy was its need to
reduce costs, and the court determined this to be an RFOA. Id The EEOC tried
to show that there was a less discriminatory alternative, that the charging party
would take a lower salary, but the court said this would violate the seniority
system under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 933.
260. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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defense is not an impediment to applying the defense of business
necessity to disparate impact cases under the ADEA.26' Early on,
the Supreme Court allowed the employer to escape liability by
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in a disparate
treatment case under Title V1. 2162 Despite the presence of the
RFOA defense in the ADEA, the courts have applied the judicially
created defense of legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to ADEA
disparate treatment cases. Business necessity was also judicially
created as a defense to disparate impact cases under Title V1. 263
Analogously to disparate treatment, the presence of the defense of
RFOA in the ADEA should not be an impediment to using
business necessity as the defense for disparate impact. In fact, now
that the Supreme Court has apparently equated RFOA with
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, it could be argued that
RFOA applies only in the context in which legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason would apply: disparate treatment cases."
If the Court determines that RFOA is the defense to disparate
impact under the ADEA, the decision in Hazen Paper may have
foreclosed the argument that disparate impact applies to the ADEA.
Before Hazen Paper, an argument could be made that RFOA at least
allowed the use of disparate impact. If the employer used a factor
that had a disparate impact on the protected age group, the
employer was justified in using it if he could show that he had a
reasonable basis for doing so. After Hazen Paper, the argument may
cogently be made that any factor other age, no matter how strongly
correlated with age, is an RFOA.2  Obviously there is no room for
261. See Eglit, supra note 30, at 198-205.
262. See Eglit, supra note 30, at 198-205.
263. Congress has recognized the disparate impact theory in Title VII cases
by amending Title VII to specifically include cases of disparate impact. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), as amended by Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
264. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
265. Id at 611. The Court noted, however, that its decision should not be
read to allow'the use of factors that are merely pretextual. Id at 613. Presumably,
determinations based upon factors that are perfectly correlated with age do not
qualify as reasonable factors other than age. At least one circuit has so held.
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the disparate impact model if the defense to disparate impact is
RFOA as interpreted by Hazen Paper.
Congress did not intend, and before Hazen Paper the lower
courts overwhelmingly agreed, that employers should be able to
rely on factors that strongly correlate with age without justifying
them in some way.2 As Professor Player reasoned, RFOA should
be the defense, but only if it were interpreted to exclude factors that
are inherently age-related.267 Because the Supreme Court may have
foreclosed this interpretation, the question remains of how the
ADEA can be rehabilitated.
VI. SOLUTION
To interpret "reasonable factors other than age" to mean "any
factor other than age" eliminates the term reasonable from the
legislation and allows all but the most obvious age discrimination,
in contravention of sound statutory construction, obvious
congressional policy, and the view that prevailed in circuit and
district courts before Hazen Paper.268 Thus, at the least, the Court
should limit its holding in Hazen Paper to-mean only that while the
use of an age-correlated factor is not discriminatory per se, it does
require justification. Other solutions - those which do more than
contain the spread of damage to the statutory scheme - require
congressional action, which is unlikely. 69 Thus, perhaps the most
Johnson v. New York, 49 F.3d 75 (2d Cir, 1995); see supra text accompanying.
note 122.
266. See dis'cussion supra part IV.B.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
268. Before Hazen Paper, the overwhelming majority of lower courts held
that the use of age-correlated criteria always required justification. See supra note
105. The Court's interpretation of RFOA is also inconsistent with RFOA's
counterpart in the Equal Pay Act, "any factor other than sex." Most courts
interpret this factor to be reasonable, not just any factor other than sex. See supra
text accompanying notes 90-101.
269. Congress is dominated by Republicans who have "contracted with
America" to decrease government regulation of business. A.M. Rosenthal,
American Class Struggle. Contract with America Turning Out to Be More Than
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productive discussion focuses on how lower courts should interpret
the ADEA after Hazen Paper in both disparate treatment and
disparate impact cases.
A. Disparate Treatment
Rather than limit Hazen Paper to its holding, many lower courts
are giving it an unduly expansive reading. Lower courts are not
only treating age-correlated factors as insufficient evidence of
discrimination but are granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, even in the face of other evidence of pretext. Yet the
use of an age-correlated criterion - while not dispositive of the issue
of intentional discrimination after Hazen Paper - should be
considered serious, not insignificant, evidence that discrimination
did occur. Treating such evidence as insignificant 2 7 1 carries Hazen
,Paper too far. The Court has ruled only that the use of age-
correlated factors standing alone does not constitute intentional
discrimination and indicated that in the absence of proof of pretext
such factors are a sufficient defense. The Court did not rule that
age-correlated factors do not constitute evidence of discrimina-
tion.' In fact, a factor strongly correlated with age, plus any other
evidence of pretext, should suffice to constitute a prima facie case
and defeat a motion for summary judgment in favor of the
Those That Votedfor It Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at A15. Congress
could, for instance, specify that RFOA is an affirmative defense that requires the
employer to bear the burden of persuasion that the use of any age-correlated
factor is justified by business necessity. Alternatively, Congress could amend the
ADEA to codify the disparate impact model, as in the 1991 amendments to Title
VII.
Whether the Court will repudiate its language in Hazen Paper and require
the employer to justify the use of an age-correlated criterion is also improbable,
because Hazen Paper was a unanimous decision. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 604.
270. See supra text accompanying note 114.
271. Id In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976),
the Supreme Court ruled that a showing of disparate impact, while not sufficient
in itself, is evidence of intentional discrimination.




Indeed, if the correlation to age is strong and there is some
evidence of pretext, the burden of persuasion should shift to the
defendant. This interpretation of RFOA is strongly supported by
the Equal Pay Act's defense of "any other factor other than sex,"
which likely served as the model for RFOA. Under the Equal Pay
Act, "any other factor other than sex" is an affirmative defense,
while under the ADEA, RFOA may be treated differently.2 4 If this
approach were adopted for the ADEA, once the plaintiff proves
that the employer has used a factor that correlates strongly with age
and provides any other evidence that the criterion is a pretext for
discrimination, the employer would bear the burden of justifying
the use of the age-correlated factor. 75
273. Cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
274. See Eglit, supra note 30, at 192-96, 210-17.
275. See Gregory, supra note 77. Mr. Gregory also stated that the employer
should bear the burden of persuasion to justify using an age-correlated criterion.
He did not think that the Supreme Court required, in addition, proof of pretext
in Hazen Paper. At present, the employee bears the burden of persuasion
throughout the usual ADEA case. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. The
Supreme Court did not discuss burdens of persuasion in Hazen Paper, 507 U.S.
604 (1993).
In a Title VII case that applies as well to the ADEA, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (superseded in part by statute), see supra note 56,
the Supreme Court ruled that if the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence that the
employer was motivated in part by discrimination, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the defendant to prove that legal motivations predominated. 490 U.S.
at 244-45. In an ADEA case, if the plaintiff proves that the employer used an age-
correlated criterion and presents other evidence that the criterion was a pretext
for discrimination, the burden of persuasion should shift to the defendant. In
Price Waterhouse a four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court opined that the
burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant when the plaintiff proves that a
protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the decision in an adverse
employment action. Id at 244. The plurality in Price Waterhouse did not specify
what kind of evidence shifts the burden of persuasion, although the case involved
direct evidence. The dissent questioned, however, whether only direct evidence
was sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion. Id at 286-93 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Although no majority opinion was entered in Price Waterhouse, the
decision resulted in direct precedent because the four justices of the plurality
(Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), as well as two individually
1995]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
The question arises as to when a factor is sufficiently correlated
with age to justify imposing the burden of persuasion on the
defendant. The burden of persuasion certainly should shift to the
employer to justify the use of the age-correlated factors that are
historically associated with age, such as seniority, higher salary,
tenure, experience, and years of service, assuming that the plaintiff
can produce any evidence of pretext, such as the plaintiff's
replacement by a substantially younger person.
For other factors that correlate with age in the employer's
particular workforce, the plaintiff could provide the necessary
correlation by proving a case that is analogous to a pattern and
practice suit under Title V]l. 2 7' To determine whether a factor is
strongly correlated with age, the courts can borrow the disparate
impact formulation of whether a criterion has a statistically
significant effect on a protected group, so that the impact cannot be
said to have happened by chance.7 As discussed earlier, the four-
fifths rule or the two to three standard deviations rule should
provide a sufficiently strong correlation. 8 The courts can use the
idea of a gross statistical disparity to indicate a sufficiently strong
correlation to shift the burden of persuasion, with less evidence of
pretext. In other words, a statistically significant disparity with
strong evidence of pretext would be sufficient to shift the burden
of persuasion in some cases, while a gross statistical disparity, along
concurring justices (White and O'Connor) all agreed that the defendant
employer should bear the burden of proving that although its employment
decision was based in part on an unlawful motive, it would have reached the
same result considering only legitimate factors. Id at 244-48, 258-61, 261-79. The
issue is moot for Title VII cases, because the 1991 Civil Rights Act superseded
Price Waterhouse for Title VII cases. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See supra text
accompanying notes 55-58. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying note
59, Congress did not amend the ADEA in this regard, and Price Waterhouse in
all probability applies to the ADEA. See Eglit, supra note 28, at 1153-58.
276. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
339 (1977).
277. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46.
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with less evidence of pretext, would be sufficient in others.27 9
Although in theory the use of age-correlated factors alone
should be enough to require the employer to prove that use of the
factor was justified,2m the Supreme Court in Hazen Paper reasoned
that unjustified use of an age-correlated criterion does not violate
the ADEA, absent proof of pretext!" In addition, the Court ruled
that an age-correlated factor could serve as a factor other than age
or a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, absent evidence of
pretext .21 Consequently, an age-correlated criterion alone would be
insufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer;
pretext must also be shown.
Thus, the employer should bear the burden of proof and
persuasion to justify the use of the age-correlated criterion and to
refute the evidence of pretext. The employer should be required,
however, to justify a policy that impacts older workers on some
basis other than general cost saving. Additional proof should be
required showing that the employer had a basis for burdening a
class of older workers.283 Professor Kaminshine's approach would
279. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977) (prima fade case was based on plaintiffs' showing that the company hired
virtually no black or Hispanic over-the-road truckdrivers, in addition to
anecdotal evidence of intentional discrimination).
280. Professor Howard Eglit has contended that RFOA should be an
affirmative defense in some but not all situations. When the plaintiff is
attempting to prove a Burdine-McDonnell Douglas circumstantial evidence case,
the burden of persuasion would remain on the plaintiff at all times. See Eglit,
supra note 30, at 219-26. RFOA, however, should be an affirmative defense in
pattern and practice and direct evidence cases. In addition, RFOA should be
equated, in Eglit's view, with business necessity in disparate impact cases.
Professor Eglit wrote his article before Wards Cove and Hazen Paper were
decided, so his interpretation that RFOA/ business necesssity would be an
affirmative defense in disparate impact cases must be reconsidered as set forth
below. See infra text accompanying notes 287-97.
281. 507 U.S. at 610.
282. Id at 611.
283. Cf EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984) (requiring
the employer to prove that burdening the class of people over 55 was the least
detrimental alternative).
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be a helpful addition to the defense of RFOA at this point. 84 If the
employer were attempting to justify the use of an age-correlated
criterion, such as high salary, as a cost saving, the employer would
be required to show that the saving significantly serves the
employer's goals. In addition, the employer would be required to
justify more specifically the impact on higher salaried employees.285
This solution comports as well with the interpretations of the
Equal Pay Act's defense of "any other factor other than sex,"
which, as discussed above, usually requires the employer to produce
a business reason for impacting a class based on sex.286
B. Disparate Impact
Before Hazen Paper, most courts recognized disparate impact
actions under the ADEA, using business necessity as the defense."
This interpretation allows the scheme of the ADEA to be carried
out: Discrimination that correlates with age would be prohibited
unless the employer could prove that it had a reasonable basis for
imposing the age-correlated criterion.
Requiring plaintiffs to challenge the use of age-related criteria
through the vehicle of a disparate impact claim raises several
problems.288 One of the most obvious problems is that the number
284. Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 279-83.
285. Kaminshine, supra note 25, at 280-81; EEOC v. Insurance Co., 49 F.3d
1418 (9th Cir. 1995). See supra note 116 for the facts of EEOC v. Insurance Co.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 96-10 1.
287. See supra text accompanying note 130.
288. Some are problems that all disparate impact suits have after Wards Cove,
some of which are perpetuated by the 1991 Act. Leidig v. Honeywell, 850 F.
Supp. 796 (D. Minn. 1994), is typical. In Leidig, the plaintiff showed that after
layoff, 30% of the employees over 50 remained, while 70% of the employees
under 50 were employed. Id at 802. The court determined that the plaintiff did
not prove a prima facie case, because he did not produce evidence of statistical
significance. Also, he did not show causation, because he did not show that the
challenged criterion, flexibility, caused the impact. Furthermore, he did not
explain why a comparison of persons over 50 to persons under 50 was relevant
to the reduction-in-force. Finally, the plaintiff failed to eliminate
nondiscriminatory explanations such as retirement. Id The court also expressed
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of people affected has to be sufficiently large in order to be
statistically significant.2" Wards Cove290 exacerbated this problem
by requiring the plaintiff to prove causation, that is, that a
particular criterion has a disparate impact. This means that in order
to be statistically significant, one criterion would have to have had
a disparate impact on a fairly large number of people.291
concern that the plaintiff used persons over 50 instead of persons over 40. Id at
803 n.7. Clearly, after Wards Cove, getting past the prima facie case stage will be
difficult.
As confirmation of the problems of proving a disparate impact case under
the ADEA, one commentator's research revealedthat as of the date of his
research only two disparate impact cases under the ADEA had ever been
successful. See Sloan, supra note 19, at 520.
289. See ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 1375-76; see, e.g.,
Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, 870 F. Supp. 1254, (D.N.J. 1994) (sample size
of 16 was insufficient to find disparate impact), affd, 67 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
It should be noted that this part of the Article is contemplating an individual case
of disparate impact, not a class action, which would present other problems for
the ADEA plaintiff. See supra note 61.
290. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
291. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 101-02; Armbruster v.
Unisys Corp., 1996 WL 55659 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (granting summary judgment
based on plaintiff's failure to identify in a timely manner criterion causing the
disparate impact). This problem exists for Title VII, as well, because the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 did not change the prima facie case problem of Wards Cove,
which requires the plaintiff to pick out the criterion causing the disparate impact.
See supra text accompanying notes 143-44. The 1991 Act does require the
defendant to bear the burden of persuasion once the plaintiff gets past this stage,
while Wards Cove does not. 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2(K)(1)(A) (Supp. V. 1993).
An additional problem is whether the plaintiff can prove disparate impact
by showing, for example, that a criterion impacts persons 55 and older or
whether the plaintiff has to prove that the criterion has a disparate impact on
persons over 40. Compare Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1129 (D.
Dela. 1994) ("[F]ailure to accord protection to subsets of the protected class
would allow an employer to adopt facially neutral policies which had a
profoundly disparate impact on individuals over age 50 or 55, so long as persons
under age 50 or 55 received sufficiently favorable treatment that the adverse
impact on individuals over 40 was minimal."), with Lowe v. Commack Union
Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1371, 1373 (2d Cir. 1989) (contending that
dividing up the protected class bypasses the plain language of the ADEA, which
protects the entire class of persons between 40 and 70).
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At least one court has indicated that courts should not apply
such strict standards to these statistics. 292 Another solution is to
allow such criteria as salary, seniority, and tenure, which
commonly are age-correlated, to be presumptively prima facie
proof of disparate impact, because they would impact the general
population in such a way. 3
As Wards Cove indicated, the defendant at this point must
articulate that the criterion significantly serves the employer's
employment goals. 4 Although the employer bears the burden of
production and not persuasion, 295  as opposed to the
recommendation set forth above for disparate treatment cases, the
type of proof required to justify an age-correlated factor in a
disparate impact case should be the same as the type of proof
recommended above for justifying such a factor in a disparate
treatment case. The employer must show not only that the use of
the age-related criterion was significantly related to its employment
goals but also that it had an articulable reason for burdening the
class of older employees.296 If the courts choose to apply a lower
standard of business necessity at this point, which would allow a
general goal such as cost saving to be a business necessity, without
more, the employee could still win by showing other alternatives
to saving money without impacting the protected class.297
292. Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1122 (D. Dela. 1994).
293. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) ("There is no
requirement, however, that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must
always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants.").
294. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
295. let
296. See supra text accompanying notes 283-86. In a disparate impact case, the
employer usually would have no evidence of pretext to refute, because the
employee's prima facie case does not require a showing that the criterion is a
pretext for intentional discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 38.
297. If the employer were able to justify the criterion, Professor Kaminshine
suggests less discriminatory alternatives, including salary reduction. Kaminshine,
supra note 25, at 283-84. Although a salary reduction would seem to violate that
Act as well, if the Court's interpretation of the ADEA allows older employees
to be fired because of high salaries, a salary reduction could be similarly justified.




We have reached the time when a court can characterize the
employer's avowed preference for a "'younger and cheaper'
engineer" and its decision "'to get rid of the older employees with
the higher salaries,'" as "primarily indicative of a desire to save
money by employing persons at lower pay," which requires no
justification.298 Employers should have to justify the use of age-
correlated criteria. The most obvious and reasonable interpretation
of the ADEA is that this justification should be an affirmative
defense in which the employer must justify the use of any age-
correlated criterion as a reasonable - not just any - factor other
than age. After Hazen Paper, however, the employer in a disparate
treatment case should at least bear the burden of persuasion if the
employee can produce other evidence of intentional discrimination.
If the Court ultimately decides that RFOA means any factor
other than age, it is at best an imperfect solution to fall back on the
disparate impact theory alone to repair the damage done to the
ADEA. If the Court ultimately decides, in addition, that disparate
impact does not apply to the ADEA, the employer's ability to rid
his workforce of older workers will be virtually unlimited.
would lead to poor employee morale and, thus, would not be equally as effective
as required by Wards Cove. See supra text accompanying notes 169-73.
The problem is this: "most older employees (who have difficulty getting new
jobs) would prefer a wage reduction to being fired, and many employers,
knowing of the morale problems created by wage cuts, would prefer to terminate
older employees rather than have them remain at work with their morale in
serious disarray because their pay was reduced." Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828
F.2d 1202, 1210 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled by Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
298. Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1218 (5th Cir. 1995). For
other similar cases, see cases cited supra note 54.
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